Sudan Intrigues: Will the Center Hold ?

Published on 8th March 2010

Conclusion: Is Secession the Only Option?

 

The unfolding events have underlined the fact that the parties to the Naivasha Agreement have failed to achieve its most important component, namely confidence-building. Southerners continue to accuse Northerners of breaking their promises (the title of a book written by renowned Southern judge Abil Alir). In the years following the agreement the two sides both had great misgivings and apprehensions, hence the suspension in the implementation of the agreement and the tension in relations. In addition, Sudan is experiencing problems that help accelerate secession. The Darfur crisis continues to worsen, and the negotiations and mediations have come to a standstill.

 

Furthermore, despite attempts to minimize the effect of the ICC’s decision on Sudanese politics, Al- Bashir has become a “handicapped” president. He cannot travel freely and thus has been unable to attend meetings of the UN General Assembly, the climate summit at Copenhagen, or even the inauguration ceremony for the South African president. Furthermore, the country’s descent into a grinding economic crisis is among the problems hampering the initiation of new policies to avert the inevitability of secession, a crisis that has local roots and is not merely a reflection of the global downturn. Sudan is in the grip of a food gap that threatens famine, particularly in the South, the East and Darfur. Local and international agencies have predicted that the shortage will rise to 60% of grain production due to drought, underfunding, and poor preparation for the summer cropping season.

 

Amidst these overlapping crises there are no political forces – either in the government or the opposition – that are capable of reversing the rapid descent towards secession. Thus time has run out and we no longer hear any talk of “the pull of unity,” but rather of “a smooth and peaceful secession to avoid the country’s return to war” (this is a verbatim statement made by NCP leader Al- Dardiri Mohamed Ahmed, as quoted in the Sudanese press on January 11th, 2010.) Holding meetings to discuss post-secession arrangements has been a concern within political and academic circles in recent times, on subjects such as borders, oil and nationality. As for the SPLM, it has recently called for a relief program, or what the movement’s Deputy General-Secretary, Yasir Arman, called the “300 days program,” to include all Sudanese in the resolution of the Darfur crisis, the elections and the referendum. In the same context, Mr. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, has called for a political summit to set out the features of the coming period. He stressed that the current situation in Sudan has killed off a large part of national sovereignty and made the secession of the South more likely. He emphasized that many factors have rendered the unity of Sudan in its present form impossible, and as an alternative to a unified Sudan proposed a confederation to bring together Sudan, Egypt, Libya and Ethiopia.

 

It has become clear that the two parties to the agreement have failed to make unity attractive because of their politically immature practices. They are now at a stage of trading accusations and blame, and apportioning responsibility to the other side. They both fear bearing national, moral and historical responsibility for the secession. But what is happening now was anticipated. Thus we find ourselves before two parallel, contradictory projects that do not meet in the middle: the Islamic civilizational project and a secular democratic project, as their proponents term them. In the first project, the state is based on the unity of faith, and in the second on the foundations of citizenship and nondiscrimination on the basis of faith, color, race or sex. Hence the SPLM accused the NCP of not having changed following the agreement, but of trying only to “fill new bottles with old wine,” i.e. continuing to impose the ideology of Islamism in new ways. The NCP retorted that the SPLM had not acted as a partner, that it had concerned itself exclusively with the South and behaved like an autonomous southern government, and was not interested in public affairs.

 

It should be noted that within the Sudanese Islamist movement there is an internal stream that calls for the severance of the South as non-Muslim and a stumbling block to the realization of a “pure” Islamic state. This faction split off to found its own party, the Comprehensive Peace Platform, which publishes the newspaper Al-Intibaha. It calls for the immediate separation of the South, and for Northerners to take the initiative before the referendum on the secession of the South. This stream is by no means isolated, but enjoys support from within the ruling NCP party.

 

The other political forces – besides the signatories of the agreement – have not set out an independent position in favor of unity. They have contented themselves, particularly in recent times, with aligning themselves with one or the other party, as was the case at the Kenana Conference, organized by the NCP, and the Juba Conference, engineered by the SPLM. Moreover, these alliances or alignments are not based on a national unity platform, but are merely temporary partisan configurations.

 

The NCP has succeeded in creating some kind of equivalence between its own presence and the continued unity of the homeland, and in persuading others that its downfall would spell the end of Sudan. At the same time, all political parties have proven incapable of reforming their political programs and leadership, who have aged and are no longer persuasive or able to keep up with developments, and have therefore not presented themselves as an alternative. In addition are the growing divisions and the emergence of regional entities, at the expense of the major political organizations.

 

At the regional level, both Arab and African, no efforts are being made to avert secession. Egypt no longer plays any effective role in Sudanese politics. The negotiations were held in Naivasha (Kenya), a clear indication of the end of the Egyptian role in resolving the Sudanese issue. At the time, Egyptian attention was directed eastwards. There is now talk about water and Egyptian national security in case of secession, but no practical efforts to help the option of unity to prevail. Libya continues to practice the “policy of no policy” towards Sudan, as it is difficult to identify any sustained Libyan position. Indeed, Tripoli

has at times played a duplicitous role, as it did in Darfur. And the question of the South has never been a concern for Saudi Arabia. In fact, the only Arab country to have displayed an interest in Sudan is Qatar, but this interest is part of the theatrical diplomacy pursued by Doha. African states are basically in unison in not opposing secession, on condition that it does not lead to destabilization in Africa.

 

The international community, too, is in general not opposed to secession, only because it sponsored and guaranteed the Naivasha Agreement, which provides for a referendum on the right to self-determination that allows for the two eventualities of unity or secession.

 

 The concern is that secession should not generate instability in the region. Thus Western states are concerning themselves with the post-secession arrangements. It is not the case, as repeatedly claimed in government circles, that the West is trying to bring about secession; rather, it is in favor of a situation that will produce stability, combat terrorism and integrate Sudan into the global economy. These are the objectives and interests of the West, and it makes no difference to it whether they are achieved by a united or a divided Sudan.

 

This, then, is the image before us: a failed state, a crippled peace agreement, a war and ongoing tribal conflicts in Darfur, and a grinding economic crisis - all within a regional and international climate of indifference. Thus, based on these facts, secession appears to be an inevitability.

 

The end.

By Haydar Ibrahim

Director, Center for Sudanese Studies.

Courtesy: Arab Reform Initiative.


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