Part 1

Most NGOs in Africa are purely functional, whether they are working in the area of welfare, development, refugees, debt or human rights. Very few of them might be considered as 'thinking' NGOs, for sitting back and reflecting on what they are doing and how their particular activity is related to the broader issues related to state, society and development in the present international context. Unthinkingly, thus, many purely functional NGOs act as mere palliatives to reduce the effects of the deteriorating social and economic conditions in Africa. Many international NGOs that used to undertake 'development' work in Africa have now shifted their resources to welfare and refugee work. They are doing 'good work' in these fields, no doubt, but unwittingly perpetuate the very conditions that they seek to alleviate.

The concept of good governance came into prominence when donors decided that it was not enough to institute economic reforms in Africa, that it was necessary, in addition, to reform the manner in which African governments were carrying out the business of governance. This is a move in the right direction; indeed, the question is why the matter of governance was not linked to development well before now, since clearly development is not simply an economic exercise. The job of 'thinking' NGOs is to understand the circumstances under which governance has become a donor issue, the manner in which the issue is used to further entrench donor control over Africa, and how the exercise of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) fits into the present international conjuncture. Specifically, there are six areas in which democratic and patriotic African NGOs, and those international NGOs which are their allies, can make a useful contribution to the present debate on 'good governance'.

In debating about 'good governance' they must insist on broadening the concept to include 'effective', as well as 'democratic' and humane governance. They must continually remind all those who care to listen that people of Africa have been fighting for democratic governance for centuries. The West has woken up to the importance of democracy only in recent years, and they must explain this phenomenon in relation to the recent changes in the international situation. They must explain that the West's recent conversion to democracy in Africa is purely opportunistic. They must, further, explain that in the present international conjuncture, 'governance' is for the benefit of primarily the large foreign corporations that control the vast resources of Africa, and a tiny clique of Africa's elite that act as the middlemen in respect of these corporations, and a section that constitutes the ruling groups carrying out the task of governance on their behalf. They must explain how the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) Project came on board the international agenda, and how this project has further disempowered African governments. The African agenda must be reclaimed and a return to the Lagos Plan of Action embraced.

Two sides of "good governance" - democratic vs effective

The language of 'good governance' among the donor community appears to limit its definition to the democratic or human rights content and technicalities of western democratic practice such as the holding of multi-party elections and the recognition of the role of the opposition. At other times, it gets broadened to include the larger civic and political rights, such as the right to free and fair trial, the right to freedom of expression and organisation, and so on. These are, of course, very important values of society, but they nonetheless constitute a rather limited understanding of the concept of 'good governance'. 'Good governance' in the sense of an accountable and humane government is indeed an important element of it, and nobody should discount its significance.  

But there is yet another side to 'good governance', and that is 'effective governance'. These two sides to 'good governance' are not necessarily mutually compatible. One side relates to the manner in which those who govern are accountable to those on whose behalf they purport to govern. The second side has to do with its effectiveness. The question of effectiveness brings into the discussion many other aspects of governance that are outside the issue of democracy and accountability. There is, to start with one such aspect, the issue of maintaining order. In certain circumstances, in situations of national catastrophe such as an earthquake or war for example, the demands of order could take priority over those of accountability. In times of major wars, governments in the West have systematically suspended democratic principles for the sake of 'effectiveness'. Winston Churchill in the case of England during the Second World War was no democrat; he was simply an effective war leader who made decisions as the exigencies of the war dictated.

Another aspect of 'effectiveness' has to do with economic growth. One theory has it that only democratic modes of governance can generate sustainable growth. That may be so. But it remains to be proven. Both Singapore and South Korea have shown that there is no necessary correlation between democracy and growth. Lee Kwan Yew is no democrat, at least not in the way the West understands democracy. Neither were succeeding regimes in South Korea democratic; they systematically suppressed all independent expressions of popular freedom, including those of political parties and workers' organisations.

Another aspect of 'effectiveness' is welfare. How effectively does a government look after the welfare of its population? Accountability and effectiveness are two different matters. They may be compatible. But there is more empirical and historical evidence that they are not than that they are. Their embodiment in the concept of 'good governance' only shows that the issue of governance is not as simple as is sometimes made out by politicians, donor governments brandishing the flag of 'democratic conditionality' and media people. It is a complex subject.

The democratic pretensions of the West are premised on subverting the democratic traditions of Africa  

Democratic governance, which is only one side of good governance, is not a gift of the West to Africa. "The African leaders are so corrupt and damned authoritarian; we from the West have the responsibility to teach them democracy," they say. Democratise yourselves, they say, or else we shall not provide aid. This is usually said with a certain air of finality combined with arrogance. What does one make of this claim by the West that they have to teach democracy to Africans? Historians will, for sure, agree that these pretensions of the West have only to be stated for their absurdity and ahistoricity to be exposed to the light of history.  

Africa, in the pre-colonial period, was no heaven. But it was no hell either - not any more than other parts of the world, including Europe. In terms of governance Africa was probably more democratic than most other parts of the world, including Europe. Basil Davidson, in his documented history of Africa, may have faulted on the romantic side, but his basic thesis about the remarkably high degree of civilization that existed in Africa prior to the coming of the Europeans is basically correct.

Africa has had a long tradition of democracy based on the accountability of the rulers to the ruled. For sure there were lapses, weaknesses and differences between, for instance, segmentary or acephalous societies and societies with state-like structures. Nonetheless, the rulers were accountable to their people, to their ancestors, and to a regime of democratic principles (rule of law, trial by jury, compensation for injury, taboo against killing, and a sense of community responsibility for the welfare of the vulnerable sections of society) and checks and balances. That long and tested tradition was subverted during the colonial period and, within a short time-span of a generation, and in the face of massive resistance from the African people, an authoritarian, external, unaccountable and undemocratic tradition was imposed. Let anybody try contradict this historical fact. They would have to rewrite history.

What took the place of democratic governance was effective governance in the name of order and growth. But whose order and whose growth? Colonial governance benefited the rulers but not the ruled. The African societies were ruptured, their cultural, religious, and social institutions torn apart. Words like 'rupture' and 'torn apart' may sound emotive. But use softer verbs, if you like, the reality would not change. The nerve-racking scenarios of Rwanda and Somalia today have to do, in no small measure, to the fragmentation of those societies during the colonial period. And what about the economy? African economies were robbed of their autonomy and restructured, readjusted, to serve imperial economies. That was when the first Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was carried out in Africa.

Having lost the battle to the superior military colonising forces of European powers, Africans continued their struggle for democracy and self-determination. African peasants, workers, students, businessmen, intellectuals and democrats have been fighting against the undemocratic colonial and racist system ever since. The struggle of the Mau Mau in Kenya for land and freedom, for example, was a democratic struggle. And so was the struggle in Uganda of farm workers for better prices for their cotton, and of the cooperatives to be allowed to market the lint. And so was the struggle in Angola and Mozambique against NATO-supported undemocratic Portuguese rule. And so also the struggle in Zimbabwe, and in South Africa. At the end of the day, democratic forces won, but it was no thanks to the West.

Even after African countries had won their political independence, the West did not cease their undemocratic practices in Africa. Throughout the cold war era, the United States and the former colonial countries had subordinated African people's demand for democracy to promoting their own cold war objectives.

Even then, their practice is at variance with their own self­proclaimed principles. Thus, the 1994 elections in Kenya was pronounced 'democratic enough' by the United Kingdom, eager to protect its investments there, and not democratic enough by the United States, eager to open up the country to American capital. Both countries are profoundly opportunistic in the way they understand democracy. The West applies one definition of democracy to Nigeria, another to Algeria. They have no consistency in their practice. 

Multi-party elections are definitely a positive development in Africa. The opening up of the political system so that alternatives can be discussed by the people at the grassroots level, too, is a positive development. But let not the West take the credit for these developments.

I am not letting African governments off the hook. On the contrary, most of them were (and are) thoroughly undemocratic, many of them under military rule, and several of them openly murderous and brutal. But the Mobutus and Bokassas and Amins of Africa were not Africa's dictators. They were West's dictators. During the cold war era, the Western quip was: "Granted, Mobutu is a dictator, but at least he is our dictator." The likes of Nkrumah and Lumumba, genuine African pan-Africanists, on the other hand, were either killed or couped.

All this is known and documented. The unfortunate thing about history, however, is that people forget. Ever since the end of the cold war, the West has suddenly appeared on the African scene as champions of democracy. If it were not so tragic, it could even have been funny, and we could have all laughed about it. But the past has not been funny. Nor indeed the present. The West's espousal of the cause of democracy is still self-serving, opportunistic, not genuine, not honest.

Post-independence governance 

The common people of Africa have not benefited from post-independence governance. If anything, they are materially and physically worse off than before. Famine and civil strife are daily taking a massive toll of African lives. The external debt of sub-Saharan Africa is roughly equal to their entire combined national incomes. Africa uses up almost half of the total value of its exports to service debts of which 90% should not be paid in any case, for many of them are either fraudulent (in the technical, legal, sense of the term) or are accumulated interest. The facts are that the commodity prices of Africa's exports have tumbled over the decades, and African peasants are working three to four times harder today than two decades ago just to receive the same quantum of value, of which then 40% goes to service the debts. Africa's commodities are undervalued, African peasants over-exploited, and African governments are trapped in a vicious circle out of which, as individual members of government, they can escape only through graft and kickbacks from transnationals who win tenders for projects which do not benefit the masses of the people. And finally, and not the least, the facts are that the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that have been going on in most of Africa over the last decade or more have worsened, not bettered, the condition of the common people of Africa in terms of health, access to education, and access to basic means of survival.

One can go on documenting these hard realities of post-independence Africa. But it is not necessary, for we have the answer to the question, "whose governance?" It certainly is not governance on behalf of the common people. It is governance on behalf of a couple of hundred industrial and banking transnationals who are draining Africa's natural resources at enormous profit for themselves (see their annual reports to their shareholders), a couple of thousand African billionaires who have tucked away their ill-gotten gains in Western banks, a couple of million white settlers who still own farmlands, mines and tourist resorts in Africa, and a couple of million black intermediaries who are acting on behalf of their foreign companies. That's the rough arithmetic of those who benefit from the rich resources of Africa. Excluding the transnationals, they constitute barely 0.5% of Africa's population. Along with the transnationals, they are in competition with one another over who receives how much of the African bonanza, but over and above their daily bickering, they are in league, not a conspiratorial league, but a league maintained by 'the invisible market'.

Who has made such a mess of Africa? The corrupt leaders, say the people, leaders who are self-serving and power hungry. Lazy people, say the leaders, people who just wait for the government to give them jobs and to feed them. Bad governments, says the World Bank and the transnationals, governments that have not followed correct fiscal, monetary, pricing and trade policies, and governments that are not accountable to their population. The market, say the left intellectuals (African and non-African), the invisible forces of which work in favour of those who own capital and who exercise state power. Out of these four possible explanations, it is the World Bank-TNC's analyses and prescriptions that dominate the ideological realm. They have so much human as well as financial resources at their command that to challenge them is an uphill struggle. In the battlefield of competing ideas, the playing fields are not level.

By Yash Tandon
International South Group Network (ISGN)
Harare.