Kenya's Foreign Affairs CS, Amina Mohamed

A review of the reputational dimensions of Kenya’s foreign affairs and diplomacy in 2015 would indicate that the country made as many global hits as it did misses. Kenya’s reputation is based on what it did or did not do in 2015 in such a way as to carve a good or bad image for the country in the international arena. So which are some of the hits and misses of Kenya’s international image construction initiatives in 2015 and how is the country likely to fare in 2016?

We need intellectual tools that be applied if we are to have cogent reflection on Kenya’s public opinion abroad in 2015 as prerequisite for gazing into the 2016 crystal ball? One such tool is the notion of soft power coined by Harvard international relations strategist Joseph Nye. According to him, soft power is the attraction of peoples in foreign lands rather than repelling them. Contestations and permutations of the concept aside, Nye and other public diplomacy scholars have theorized soft power as comprising indirectness, co-option, persuasiveness, intangibility, and attractiveness (of culture, ideology and institutions).

On the other hand, hard power is made up of directness, command, coercion, tangibility, inducements, threats, militarism and economics. Although I do not focus on Kenya’s hard power – admittedly necessary in a realistic world – it is worth mentioning transiently that the ICC cases facing Deputy President William Ruto and radio journalist Joshua arap Sang will continue to be an ugly source of Kenya’s attempt to secure domestic interests through direct command and coercive means for the better part of 2016. Equally, Kenya’s hiring of two US lobbyists – Podesta Group and Squire Patton Boggs – in May, reportedly at Sh48 million is more hard power than soft power going by the definition of hard power as including inducements. One, US lobbyists are not necessarily well liked in the US itself as opinion polls there can prove.

Secondly, the objectives of the lobbying are twofold: ensure US continued aid to Kenya in the face of such aid fizzling out due to US State Department’s designation of Kenya’s status as a “hotbed” of human trafficking; lobby for direct Nairobi-US flights by Kenya airways by assuring that such flights would be secure from security threats posed by terrorism. Both issues constitute an ugly rather than alluring face of Kenya and while complex, are a commentary of failures at home. 

Recognizing the limitations of soft power and hard power as polarized appositional strands in public diplomacy, the concept of smart power has been proposed to account for the utilisation of a mix of soft power and hard power in country’s pursuits for desired national outcomes abroad. A good example of the leveraging of smart power – essentially carrots and sticks – is the Somalia, where Kenya has a virtually occupying force battling Al-Shabaab (hard power) while for instance hosting of a large Somalia refugee population (soft power).

Applying the intellectual conception of soft power, one can attempt a qualitative assessment of Kenya’s global attractiveness in 2015 by investigating the role of state actors such as the presidency, the foreign affairs ministry and reputational management state corporations. On the other hand, an assessment can be undertaken from the perspective of non-state actors such as our geographical endowments, athletes, academics, civil society, artists and businesses. While making brief commentary on non-state-driven soft power, I focus on state-driven soft power with an understanding that the former requires separate incisive treatment not least because non-state soft power actors are too numerous to asses in one fell swoop.

Tracking Kenya’s soft power at home is after all, not problematic, what with the power of attractions that saw to our hosting globally acclaimed personages key among them US president Barack Obama, Pope Francis and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. It is therefore important to fill extant knowledge gaps with regards to instances of state-driven investment in projection of Kenya’s soft power in 2015 abroad.

In the period January-December 2015, some of the soft power initiatives, institutions, and personalities were: sending of a team of medical volunteers to battle the Ebola virus epidemic in Liberia, Sierra led by Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed (January). The Milan Expo (May-October); participation in tourism promotion events by former tourism cabinet secretary Phyllis Kandie and/or Kenya Tourism Board CEO Muriithi Ndegwa such as the London UK World Travel Market expo (November), the Rimini Italy TTG Incontri (October) South Africa Indaba expo (May), the Africa Kampala Travel Association Congress (November), Lagos Akwaaba Exhibition (November); tourism promotion activities in the US and China (July, May); KTB’s winning of top Safari destination award at London and Seychelles World Travel Awards (December, June); Kenya’s election to the UNWTO executive council in Medelline, Colombia (September); KTB’s media partnership with CCN International (May).

Notably, the bulk of instances of state-led investment in Kenya’s reputation abroad in 2015 revolve around tourism promotion and can therefore be parsimoniously rendered as “tourism-based soft power”. Despite initial concerns about her suitability as a CS, Phyllis Kandie, supported by the tourism sector whose face is KTB CEO Muriithi Ndegwa acquitted herself pretty well. Even the ingenious sponsoring of Kenya’s brand-name athletes such as Paul Tergat, Moses Kiptanui and Lorna Kiplagat and musicians Sauti Sol and Emmy Kosgey to participate in a marathon at the Milan Expo in September was in support of tourism, with President Uhuru Kenyatta, no less, in the lead. It is no brainer to draw the conclusion that tourism-based soft power will continue to be the goose that lays the golden egg of Kenya’s power of attraction in 2016. All things remaining equal (for instance terrorism kept at bay), the appointment of industry old hand, Najib Balala as CS Ministry of Tourism should see tourism continue playing a big role in Kenya’s soft power in 2016.  

The most significant exemplar of what we can term “foreign-policy-approach” to projection of soft power abroad is the sending of health workers to Ebola-wracked West Africa, with foreign affairs CS Amina Mohamed and former health CS James Macharia (now transport and infrastructure) in a leading role. Granted that Kenya’s involvement in “peace diplomacy” such as conflict resolution in South Sudan, Somalia, Central Africa Republic and Burundi count as foreign-policy-driven instances of soft power. However, support for Ebola-stricken West Africa is unique in that it is a rare case of volunteerism mirroring in a miniature way the famous American Peace Corps project. While immediate economic gains might not be forthcoming, this is a case of intangible soft power that can put Kenya in good stead for instance in matters geopolitical. With conflict resolution, Kenya’s diplomacy is almost constrained and obligated to act. The foreign-policy-based soft power or “track II diplomacy” is however thin and far between and the foreign affairs ministry must be urged to invest in at least one initiative similar to the support given to Liberia, Sierra Leon and Guinea this year.  

It is safe to conclude that the three broad instances of state-led investment in soft power abroad – tourism, Milan Expo, West Africa volunteerism – have scored tangible outcomes at home: an improvement on tourism arrivals year-on-year; the reciprocal visit of Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to Kenya in October with several economic pickings; and the diplomatic prestige associated with the eventual visit to Kenya of Liberian president Eleen Sirleaf Johnson in December.

Although First Lady Margaret Kenyatta’s soft power initiatives abroad do not strike at the heart of foreign policy in the same way as those by the President and CS foreign affairs do, she comes across as one of the endearing champions of Kenya’s likeability in 2015. Indeed, it is the very quasi-official feel of her initiatives abroad (and at home) – Beyond Zero – that she lent fresh breath into the promotion of Kenya’s national image abroad. After bringing home the title of UN person of the Year 2014, Ms Kenyatta’s has quietly but effectively projected soft power as much at home as abroad and one can count numerous international appearances in places as far between as South Africa on HIV-Aids advocacy and Japan, launching a marathon. All things remaining equal, it can be expected that the First-Lady-driven “diplomacy 2.0” will snowball in 2016.

It is not certain whether the feting of the late Prof Wangari Maathai by the African Union at the 24th AU summit in Johannesburg (June) by naming the gardens at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa after her had the input of Kenya’s diplomacy or not. What is on record is that the honouring of this Kenyan environmental icon and Nobel laureate was based on a proposal by the Republic of Congo. Without evidence of back-channel negotiations for Congo to do Kenya’s bidding in these respects, one can conclude that the soft power thereof is not explicitly a case of Kenya’s state-led investment.  However, a realist reading of diplomatic practice would suggest that the feting of Wangari Maathai did not just happen, thus potentially Kenya’s quiet diplomacy at work. At any rate, CS Mohamed was full of praise for the move. Just what other forms of behind-the-scenes public diplomacy leading to the lionization of Kenyan greats remains a great unknown and Kenyan diplomacy could do better in strategically publicizing such initiatives. Are there any other Kenyan greats that Kenyan diplomacy can hoist onto the international stage in 2016 with an eye on boasting soft power capital?

Obviously, there may be many state-led soft power initiatives tied to Kenya’s foreign affairs and diplomacy that fall through analytical cracks due to either poor reporting. As of this writing for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website is dysfunctional. If the Kenyan populace and researchers are to gain a better understanding of Kenya’s Track II diplomacy, there would be need for better capturing of initiatives. However, it is also safe to conclude that Kenya’s investment in soft power is generally not commensurate to the so-called “core” diplomacy bar the bottom-line inclined tourism initiatives.A consideration in 2016 would be to boost the work of the department responsible for public diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And while at it, it is curious what the role of the entity responsible for branding Kenya abroad – the Brand Kenya Board – is?

By Bob Wekesa

Dr Wekesa [email protected]   is a postdoctoral fellow at University of Witwatersrand.