The advance of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels in North Kivu Province over the last year signaled Goma’s fall sometime in the future. The capture of Minova and Sake towns on January 21 and January 23 highlighted the rebels' intent to take over Goma. This brings to light the defence posture of Congolese forces and the operational reach of the M23.

In November 2012, the M23 rebels took control of Goma town. This is a recurring issue whose stakeholders are not keen to resolve. Historically, the 2012 M23 uprising arose from a rebellion by former National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) militia group fighters. The fighters accused the DRC government of failing to integrate ethnic Tutsi fighters into the Congolese army, unevenly distributing resources, and not protecting minorities contrary to a 2009 peace agreement.

The M23 promotes the protection of Tutsi interests and other minorities. This protection is not only from other powerful entities in the DRC but also against the Hutu rebel groups that escaped from Rwanda to the DRC in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Also, consider that Rwanda, through the M23, is after the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group. The FDLR is made up of ethnic Hutus and fights alongside the Congolese forces and the Wazalendo militia group.

It is naive to consider M23’s interests as only focused on guarding the interests of the Tutsi. The dynamics of the Tutsi interests have evolved. The M23 is a proxy of the Rwandan government. Defining the interests of the Tutsi is a grey area. The appearance and operational capabilities of this rebel group indicate an organized proxy militia with clear objectives of promoting and protecting the politico-economic interests of an external power player.

The DRC’s rich endowment of minerals historically is a primary cause of the endless strife in the country. Belgium’s colonial ambitions in the DRC were motivated by its natural resources. The 1960-1963 Katanga secession conflict was due to the desire of the secessionists to prevent other parts of the country from benefiting from the region’s mineral wealth. The subsequent armed conflicts during the presidencies of Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila, and Felix Tshisekedi were caused by greed over mineral-generated wealth.

A host of armed groups are formed by local communities aggrieved by benefiting less from the exploitation of minerals. As such, global and regional powers are complicit in robbing the Congolese people. The US has for many decades controlled the mines of the Congo. China is now a powerful player in the DRC’s mining sector. But the regional powers are never mentioned loudly. Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Burundi are some of the countries that profited from the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Rwanda and Uganda still benefit from the chaos in the eastern part of the DRC mostly through proxies.

Rwanda exports significant amounts of gold and coltan yet huge quantities of these minerals are smuggled from the DRC. The M23 is entangled in these clandestine supply chain links. In 2024, the UN estimated that the M23 generated around USD 300,000 per month in revenue raised from taxes on coltan production in Rutshuru and Masisi in North Kivu. For context, Rutshuru is approximately 68.4 km from Goma. Masisi lies around 78.4 km from Goma.

Three factors largely contributed to the fall of Goma. First, is political leadership. Disorganised political leadership leads to poor outcomes. The DRC is yet to have organised political leadership over six decades after independence. Leadership matters at any level or spectrum of life whether in small, basic units such as a family to more complex and dynamic institutions and formations like governments. Paul Kagame has mastered the basics of geostrategic power moves. He seems a keen student of history and strategy. President Tshisekedi’s decisions demonstrate his naivety in handling high-stakes issues.

If Tshisekedi was strategic, he would not have pressurised the East African Community Regional Forces (EACRF) to withdraw from North Kivu by December 2023. Tshisekedi then issued an ultimatum for the EACRF troops to attack the M23 rebels to exit the country. He demanded an offensive mandate for the EACRF. Tshisekedi also called for the exit of UN peacekeepers by December 2024 but later rescinded following escalations by armed groups, including the M23. With hindsight, Tshisekedi was acting emotionally and not logically given the precarious nature of the security situation.

Suppose the EACRF attacked the M23 to appease Tshisekedi, what would be the likely outcomes? Perhaps a full-blown war involving multiple entities. Conflict resolution is not all about combat. Creating buffer zones to contain the advance of an enemy while attempting to negotiate for a win-win situation is sometimes more beneficial. The results could materialise in the long-term via this strategy but it is critical in the wake of increased inter-connectedness in regional and global economies. Such a strategy would reduce the degree of geopolitical risks as opposed to combat.

Tshisekedi intended to draw the EACRF into a proxy war against Rwanda. A scenario of the EACRF troops fighting the M23 and Rwandan forces is unthinkable. Kigali has relatively good relations with countries that contributed troops to the EACRF; Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, and Burundi. Rwanda occasionally has diplomatic spats with Uganda and Burundi but mutual respect prevails. Tshisekedi is not a shrewd strategist and no wonder Goma has fallen. The deployment of the EACRF could have prevented the advancement of the M23.

President Tshisekedi may have smiled broadly at the offensive responsibilities granted to the EACRF’s successor, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). However, the SAMIDRC has failed to contain the M23. This is mostly due to limited resources and unfamiliarity with the geography of the combat zones. It is illogical to anticipate a quickly assembled force to succeed in an unfamiliar geographical area against opponents who have mastered the entire of North Kivu’s features.

Second, military organisation or the lack of it - depending on whether it is the DRC or M23 - led to the fall of Goma. Military organisation and discipline go hand in hand with political leadership. Effective political leaders are often great strategists and they understand the essence of having powerful militaries. Well, Tshisekedi does not comprehend this, and if he does, then perhaps not clearly.

The Congolese military officers are not sharp and disciplined compared to Rwanda. The DRC military looks like a mass assembly of militias and rebels. Its level of professionalism is relatively low. Strength in numbers seldom works as a strategy in modern warfare. But Tshisekedi’s DRC religiously hangs on this chasing illusory victories against multiple armed groups.

It is embarrassing that the M23 rebels dress in much better fatigues and are more well-armed than Congolese soldiers. One would mistake the M23 for a country’s military and the Congolese forces for polished rebels. Well, this indicates the DRC’s struggles with transitioning the military to a formidable institution with first-world operational capabilities. Nonetheless, the dressing and arming of the M23 in a way affirms Rwanda’s funding of the group. Rebel groups in Africa are hardly organised and disciplined. They are usually shoddy in appearance and have limited tactical and strategic organisation. It is not enough to proclaim M23’s enhancing its operations and discipline through the proceeds from minerals.

A June 2024 UN report revealed the presence of 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in DRC territory. The report also highlighted the presence of 3,000 M23 rebels in the DRC. Rwandan troops are instrumental in sharing intelligence with the M23, hence the rebels’ strategic advancements. But this demonstrates the weak intelligence capabilities of the DRC military thus its poor organisational capabilities.

Third, the geographical dynamics of North Kivu and generally the eastern part of the DRC contributed to the fall of Goma. Geography is key to understanding warfare. But it is even more instrumental in comprehending geopolitics and geostrategic ambitions and maneuvers of state and non-state actors. The DRC is the second biggest country in Africa. For context, the DRC is bigger than Spain, France, and Germany combined. Closer home, the DRC is bigger than Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi combined.

Consider the distance between the capital Kinshasa (seat of the government) and Goma, the besieged city; approximately 2,600 km. This is almost 1,000 km more than the distance from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kampala, Uganda. It is still longer than the distance from Dar es Salaam to Uganda’s northernmost town, Moyo (1,835 km). Think about the distance from Kigali to Goma; approximately 162 km. Congolese nationals in Goma and across North Kivu are closer to Rwanda than their capital, Kinshasa. Were it not for colonial-drawn boundaries, the people of eastern DRC would derive higher benefits from the economic geography of being nearer to Kigali.

Ethnically, culturally, and linguistically, a significant population of North Kivu (including Goma) is similar or the same for Rwandans across the border. The Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa tribes are found in Rwanda and the DRC thanks to colonial boundaries. A member of any of these tribes in the DRC is much closer socio-culturally and geographically to Rwanda than other far-flung parts of the Congolese territory. The M23 practically finds it easier to thrive in North Kivu in light of these factors.

The endowment of the eastern DRC with minerals like other parts of the country is a geographical factor that puts it at risk of eternal wars. Armed groups and foreign powers capitalise on the expansive geography and the existence of weak state institutions to exploit natural resources. Furthermore, M23 rebels have mastered the geography of North Kivu and other eastern provinces. As earlier stated, this is enabled by strong intelligence sharing, a notable challenge for the Congolese military. This is probably one of the main reasons why the Congolese forces rely on the FDLR and the Wazalendo militia who seem more knowledgeable of the region’s geography. Among other factors, limited geographical familiarity seems to be working against foreign forces in eastern DRC. The UN peacekeepers and SAMIDRC are struggling with this issue.

Kinshasa and Kigali should commit to fully implementing the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes. The lack of commitment is evident. Controversially, expansive countries unable to govern themselves should consider splitting into multiple independent states. While eastern Congolese are socialised to belong to DRC proper, geographical and socio-cultural dynamics ought to lead to the creation of a sovereign state(s). Perhaps such a state would relate better with Rwanda and the remnant of the DRC. We should not hesitate to review troubled colonial boundaries. Toxic state cohabitations do not work. Such considerations should also be allowed in conflict-prone regions in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Angola among others.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.