A KDF soldier on patrol             P. Courtesy

Since the fall of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has witnessed great turmoil with the disruption of socio-political systems and processes. This has seen the displacement of the Somali people internally and forced them to flee as refugees to neighboring countries and disperse globally. In the following years, the Somali conflict has been a source of concern regionally and internationally. With no central government, the country has experienced security challenges for its nationals and the international community working in Somalia. Numerous diplomatic as well as military efforts have been made to try and resolve and normalize the situation but they yielded no positive outcomes.

Kenya's decision to militarily intervene in Somalia has brought about a mixture of skepticism and hope on the security implications of such action. To further exacerbate the situation, regional states surrounding Somalia are politically fragile due to, inter alia, weak democratic institutions, emergence of separatist groups, manipulation of tribal divisions for political gain (negative tribalism), uneven distribution of resources, marginalization, poverty, and weak government security institutions. A sustainable solution to the conflict in Somalia is largely dependent on regional stability as well as the presence of well-established domestic security institutions, not only in Somalia but the regional countries as well.

Kenya’s involvement 

Kenya plays host to a large number of Somali refugees who have flocked into the country since the country disintegrated over two decades ago. As a neighbor with a sizeable number of national Somali people who are closely related to Somalis across the border, Kenya is inevitably a stakeholder in what happens in Somalia. Somalia has at various times harbored territorial claims on Kenya’s northern districts, which are populated by Kenyan Somalis (for example, the Shifta conflicts in the 1960s).  Until 2011, Kenya has always insisted on using diplomacy as a means of addressing the Somali conflict. Being home to Africa’s largest cargo-handling port (Mombasa) in the East coast, and having a dynamic economy, it is by all means categorized as being a country full of potential for growth and development. However, as is the case with several countries in Africa, some parts of the country do not experience the presence of government law enforcement agents.

Pastoral communities have often referred to themselves as ‘second citizens’ due to their perceived marginalization. Kenya’s northern districts bordering Somalia aptly fit this description due to their remoteness from the political capital of Nairobi and its neglect in development through the years since independence in 1963. The latency of marginalized areas with limited government presence provides fertile grounds for instability, desolation and dissatisfaction due to frustration of people’s aspirations for a better future. The communities take it upon themselves to acquire arms for deterrent and offensive purposes leading to an increase of arms in civilian possession. The long term effects of these can be catastrophic as was the case in Baragoi in which 42 government security agents were killed by pastoralists as they pursued stolen cattle. Such areas therefore greatly compromise the overall stability of the nation, which may make the country more susceptible to retaliatory attacks from the al-Shabaab of Somalia. In a sense, but not legally speaking, such areas may be described as being “terra nullius” (land in which a sovereign does not exist).

Politicization of perceived unresolved injustices has also drawn cracks from which the al-Shabaab may further compromise the security of the Kenyan people so as to weaken its resolve to continue its mission in Somalia. The coastal area of Kenya has witnessed a number of violent attacks from a secessionist group referring itself as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). They have rationalized their activities citing historical land injustices against the indigenous population. There have been growing concerns that the group may have been infiltrated by members of the al-Shabaab as a retaliatory measure against the Kenyan government. Infiltration and acquisition of weapons is made possible due to porous borders and corruption involving border immigration agents.

Without a doubt, Kenya has been drawn into the conflict in Somalia in more ways than one and the results are evident in the increased threats of revenge attacks from al-Shaabab. One attack, attributed to al-Shabaab was witnessed on 10th March 2012 at a bus station in the city of Nairobi, while two other attacks, supposedly by al-Shabaab were carried out in the coastal town of Mombasa on 30th March 2012, with al-Shabaab threatening more to come unless Kenyan troops are withdrawn from Somalia.

Implications

For a better understanding of the conflict and the possible implications and consequences, the root causes of the conflict have to be effectively addressed. Poverty, poor infrastructure, lack of political stability, unemployment, and inter-clan competition are among the issues that need to be addressed urgently. Kenya has therefore tried to incorporate strategies that will improve the wellbeing of the people in areas that were once al-Shabaab strongholds. This has made the local population welcome initiatives led by the Kenya military within Somalia under the African Union (AU) banner.

However, the very same symptoms seem to be present in some areas within Kenya, such as the marginalized areas. Moreover, corruption seems to be supporting the activities of pirates and other illegal groups within Somalia. Through corruption, identity cards are issued to illegal immigrants, and money laundering takes place. Various parts of the Nairobi capital, most notably the Eastleigh area have experienced a boom in real estate investments using funds that were illegally acquired through maritime piracy. Has Kenya therefore dealt with the internal factors that support criminal groups within Somalia?

Regional security in East Africa is dependent on the security of each of the member states. The major challenge of the regional states is the achievement of political stability, a situation in which general elections are held without violence and negative tribal manipulation. For political stability to be viable, state security machinery should be felt in all areas within the country and the right to use force should remain the preserve of the central government. Kenya’s success in spearheading a peaceful Somalia is only possible if it prioritizes the pursuit of domestic security through eliminating corruption, ensuring even distribution of resources, abandoning negative ethnicity, and strengthening the capacity and reach of the police force.

Somalia is not new to external military incursions. Besides numerous attempts by countries such as Ethiopia and the USA, the situation has continued to be a sore in the eyes of the international community. There are two important factors that need to be taken into consideration as the war against the al-Shabaab terror group in Somalia continues. The first is its closer association with the al-Qaeda and its expansion drive beyond the borders of Somalia. In such a situation therefore, the Kenya military needs to craft a grand strategy to effectively paralyze these ties. A successful strategy should incorporate regional strategies that will be both coherent and well-coordinated.

By Kigen Morumbasi

The author is a Ph.D Candidate at the Institute of International Studies (IIS), Jilin University, P.R. China.