On February 17, 2025, I found information on X (Twitter) indicating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies intending to hold a meeting in Nairobi. The meeting’s objective was to ratify agreements leading to the formation of the so-called Government of Peace and Unity (GPU). This is a parallel government rivaling an inclusive one, soon-to-be established by the RSF’s antagonist, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The RSF plans to form a government in the territories it controls. This is amid the paramilitary group losing huge chunks of its controlled areas to the SAF over the last two months. The RSF’s GPU is perhaps a strategy to delegitimise an SAF-led government, or to heighten the stakes of ceasefire negotiations with the hope of getting a significant share of a transitional government. Recall that the RSF wielded political and military power as a principal partner in the transitional government before the commencement of the war in April 2015.

Hosting the RSF is a diplomatic misstep that indicates the wicky-wacky nature of Kenya’s foreign policy. A year ago, Nairobi rolled out a red carpet for the RSF leader Hemedti Dagalo. This was later followed by the Sudanese government rejecting President Ruto’s nomination by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in June 2024 to lead ceasefire negotiations. In January this year, the RSF canceled a press conference in Nairobi at the eleventh hour. No reasons were given but it could have been due to the successful SAF offensive against it.

Kenya’s foreign policy is sketchy, and lacks strategic depth. From a Machiavellian sense, Kenya could be justified to pursue its interests. Realistically, though, prevailing regional dynamics should be considered when the administration cuts opportunistic deals with genocide-committing armed groups such as the RSF.

It is not sensible to host an armed group perpetrating crimes against humanity in Sudan by targeting civilians. The RSF has its origins in the Darfur War that lasted almost two decades. The killing of around 100 protesters and injuring 500 others by the RSF in June 2019 during anti-government protests is one of the group’s high-profile human rights violations. In October 2024, around 124 civilians were killed by the RSF in the Alseriha locality in Al-Jazirah (Gezira) State. Over 200 civilians were killed by the RSF in the Al-Kadaris and Al-Khalwat localities in White Nile State from February 15 to February 17, 2025. These are few examples. Hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands injured by the RSF in other areas in Sudan since the war broke out.

Geostrategic Interests Dictating the RSF-Nairobi Relations

Why is Nairobi becoming a second home to the RSF? Well, Kenya has historically played similar roles to warring factions from Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan (before the south seceded), South Sudan, and Somalia. While these historical events cannot be ignored, it is critical to understand the context of the relations between the RSF and Kenya. First, the UAE supports the RSF financially and militarily though it denies doing so. This aid is mostly disbursed through proxies in Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, and Uganda.

Kenya has lately been courting the UAE for financial and technical support for critical infrastructure projects. The Kenyan government recently signed an agreement with the Emirati Al-Dahra agribusiness firm to develop the Galana-Kulalu Food Security Project. The Emirati royal family is a major owner of Al-Dahra. In January this year, Kenya and the UAE commenced discussions for the latter to avail finances to extend the Chinese-built standard gauge railway to Uganda and South Sudan. In mid-January this year, Kenya and the UAE signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). This CEPA seeks to enhance trade, investment, and economic cooperation between the two countries.

The bigger picture of the UAE’s increasing influence in Kenya is Abu Dhabi’s expanding geostrategic footprints in Africa. While most geopolitical and geoeconomic commentaries and analyses focus on China, the US, and Russia in Africa, little attention is paid to the UAE. The UAE is currently Africa’s largest development partner and investor with Emirati companies committing USD 100 billion for projects between 2019 and 2023.

Emirati companies, especially DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports have massively invested in seaports and dry ports in Tanzania, Rwanda, Somaliland, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sudan, Angola, the Congo Republic, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. Emirati firms have also set up or are establishing special economic zones in Somaliland and Namibia. The UAE is also a leading investor in renewable energy having invested around USD 9 billion over the last ten years.

The UAE’s geopolitical and geoeconomic engagements align with its interests of enhancing maritime security in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The ports in Berbera (Somaliland), Bosaso (Somaliland), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), and Maputo (Mozambique) are promoting the UAE’s maritime security objectives. The proposed ports of Abu Amama (Sudan) and Nacala (Mozambique) will further enhance the UAE’s maritime security ambitions.

Additionally, the UAE’s support for the DRC government against the M23 rebels, the RSF in Sudan, and the General Khalifa Haftar-led armed groups in Libya project Abu Dhabi’s broader security and geostrategic interests.

Rent-seeking motives by Kenya’s political and economic establishment could also be a primary factor underlining relations between the RSF and the Ruto-led administration. The RSF controls several gold mines in Sudan and the proceeds finance the group’s operations. Money laundering is common in wartime and Sudan is no exception. Part of the money laundering proceeds could be having channels in Kenya.

Kenya’s Foreign Policy: A Fork in the Road

Kenya has made multiple foreign policy missteps such as deploying police officers to Haiti under the Multi-national Security Support Mission, hosting the M23-led Congo River Alliance, supporting Israel at the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, engaging French President Emmanuel Macron following the fall of Goma to the M23 rebels, and withdrawing the recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Republic among others.

These diplomatic gaffes are outcomes of uneventful career politicians and inexperienced professionals in the foreign affairs docket. Raila Odinga’s recent loss of the African Union Commission Chairperson election to Djibouti’s long-time Foreign Minister Mahmoud Youssef is a reminder of Kenya’s lackluster foreign policy. The fact that Kenya has lost this election twice in the last eight years demonstrates the lack of strategic depth by Nairobi in its diplomatic engagements.

Kenya’s official foreign policy document first published in 2014 and revised in 2024 is too generic and does not demonstrate any intellectual knack or pragmatic ambitions. It is not fit to drive the republic’s 21st century aspirations and power projections to confront present and future geopolitical challenges. Time is ripe to rip apart Kenya’s foreign policy and reconstruct it.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.