South Africa stands at a pivotal moment. The 2025 Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals, approved on Wednesday 2 April, ignited a fierce battle between the two leading partners to the Government of National Unity (GNU): the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA). This conflict extends beyond policy disagreements into the realm of philosophical divergence. At its core, this is a struggle between two competing visions of governance, justice, and economic stewardship, each rooted in distinct ideological traditions.

The ANC originates from a liberation movement tradition rooted in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Its guiding ideology, although the party prefers to characterise itself as a ‘broad church’ encompassing a multiplicity of ideological perspectives, is shaped by a potent fusion of Pan-Africanism - influenced by the calibre of early thinkers like W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey who emphasised African solidarity and resistance to imperialism - socialism, and social democracy.

Accordingly, ANC’s perspectives on racial justice and nationalism resulted in a close working relationship with the Communist Party of South Africa (predecessor-in-title to the South African Communist Party) in the early 1920s; African Claims in South Africa to the 1941 Atlantic Charter; and the 1955 Freedom Charter. These perspectives were also inspired by the wave of decolonisation in Africa, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, which proved that colonialism and white minority rule in South Africa could be overthrown. 

The Nexus Between Social Justice and the Free Market

At the heart of South Africa’s economic debate lies a fundamental tension: the pursuit of social justice versus the imperatives of a free market economy.

Post-1994, the ANC, without discarding its liberation movement character, has attempted to balance state-led economic transformation with market-driven policies. This was informed by its 1992 Ready to Govern strategy document in which the party characterised the relationship between the State and capital (market) as that of ‘cooperation and contestation’. Hence, tensions between its centre-left posture and pro-business pragmatism remained a defining feature of its governance over the past thirty years.

Guided by its historical commitment to redress and redistribution, the ANC embraces a collectivist approach which is, to some degree, reminiscent of Plato’s social contract theory, as expounded in The Republic and further enriched by the so-called ‘left-liberal or egalitarian liberal’ philosopher John Rawls. In his A Theory of Justice, Rawls argued that a just society must be arranged to benefit the least advantaged, even at the cost of greater burdens on the wealthy.

In this spirit, the ANC has been an advocate for tax increases especially for corporates and the wealthy. This year it has proposed a 0.5 percentage point VAT hike over two fiscal years to address budget deficit and fund social programs and reduce inequality. Its position is clear: economic justice requires active state intervention to correct historical imbalances and provide for the marginalised.

The DA, by contrast, champions a vision aligned with a variety of ideologically liberal tendencies, including neoliberalism, social liberalism, classical liberalism, and conservative liberalism, which find resonance in the writings of Friedrich Hayek, Adam Smith and Robert Nozick. These classical economic theorists argued that economic growth, not redistribution, is the key to prosperity. Higher taxes, they contended, stifle innovation, deter investment, and place undue strain on the middle class. The DA’s resistance to tax hikes and its calls for fiscal discipline reflect a belief in market efficiency, where a leaner state fosters entrepreneurship and job creation rather than redistributive policies.

Of course, amid these ideological commitments, the DA has also engaged in strategic political manoeuvring, oscillating between two competing predictors of political behaviour – as elucidated in Political Game Theory by Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirowitz: rational self-interest (homo economicus) and social intentionality (homo sociologicus). While the DA frames itself as a champion of economic rationality, its political calculations often reflect the influence of social and electoral dynamics, requiring a delicate balancing act between principled policy positions and pragmatic political survival.

The ANC and DA’s clashing perspectives on transformation and equity policies reflect this ideological divide. From economic redress and social justice to South Africa’s foreign policy stance, their differences run deep. The ANC’s commitment to ‘progressive internationalism’, evident in its non-aligned position on the Russia-Ukraine war and firm support for Palestine in its ongoing conflict with Israel, stands in stark contrast to the DA’s more Western-aligned, pro-Israel and market-driven policy approach. These fundamental disagreements underscore a broader battle over the country’s political and economic trajectory, making compromise increasingly difficult.

This philosophical clash with the ANC has now taken centre stage in South Africa’s coalition government, exposing deep ideological rifts. The ANC sees state intervention as a moral imperative, while the DA fears that an expanding government will erode economic freedoms. This impasse mirrors the age-old debate between state control and market liberty, echoing the broader global contest between social democracy and free-market capitalism.

Idealism Versus Pragmatism

Even before the 2024 general elections confirmed that the ANC had lost its electoral majority for the first time since 1994, public discourse was dominated by a pressing question: Could these two political forces, long positioned as adversaries, find common ground in government? Now, with fiscal policy as the latest battleground, the answer appears more elusive than ever.

Yet, the reality of governance demands pragmatism. South Africa’s economy is fragile, with high unemployment and slow growth. While the ANC’s commitment to social justice is laudable, an over-reliance on taxation risks pushing businesses and skilled professionals away. Conversely, while the DA’s call for reduced public spending is fiscally sound, it must recognise that structural inequality requires proactive redress. A middle path, one that balances economic growth with targeted social investment, may offer the only viable resolution.

The future of the GNU: Options for the ANC in Reconstituting the Coalition

The latest clash and breakdown of cooperation between the ANC and DA raises urgent questions: will the DA stay in the GNU or will the ANC reconstitute the coalition and exclude the DA? The ANC has been adamant that the GNU does not necessarily depend on the DA to work, although the party’s National Working Committee (NWC) meeting on 7 April reportedly resolved that revisiting negotiations will all the GNU partners, including those parties that voted in favour of passing the 2025 Budget, is the way to go. 

Meanwhile, one of the ANC’s alliance partners – the SACP- and the ANC Youth League have called on the ANC to remove the DA from the GNU.

The DA’s Federal Executive, which met briefly last week, is yet to take a firm position on the party’s future involvement in the GNU. This while the party has approached the Western Cape High Court to challenge what it views as illegalities that resulted in the Parliamentary approval of the fiscal framework.

Perhaps, an even more poignant question is: how should the ANC proceed in reconstituting the governing coalition? Several options emerge, each with distinct philosophical and strategic implications.

A Renewed Grand Coalition with the DA

If pragmatism prevails, the ANC and DA could attempt to reset their coalition by negotiating a fiscal compromise while also agreeing on non-negotiables such as transformation and equity imperatives. This would require concessions from both sides; perhaps a scaled-down tax increase in exchange for stronger commitments to economic growth policies.

Philosophically, this would mirror the Rawlsian-Hayekian tension at the heart of democratic governance, where the challenge is to balance social justice with economic freedom. There would be a need to have a clear agreement on who is in charge of foreign policy.

The challenge is that attitudes from both sides have been hardened enough that it would prove exceedingly difficult to get the two parties to agree on transformation and redress fundamentals, especially after the DA’s public stunt on foreign policy issues.

Even ANC moderates, including Ramaphosa, have been incensed by the DA’s contradictory and bellicose foreign policy posture as well as misinformation and disinformation narratives by Afrikaner lobby group AfriForum, trade union Solidarity and the Cape Independent Advocacy Group (CIAG) about SA.

A Centrist Coalition with Smaller Parties

Instead of partnering with the DA, the ANC could look to smaller centrist and regional parties, such as ActionSA – over and above the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and GOOD that already serve in the coalition government. This approach would allow the ANC to maintain policy flexibility while avoiding extreme ideological shifts. However, managing multiple smaller partners could prove politically cumbersome.

Minority Government with Issue-Based Alliances

The ANC could govern as a minority party, somewhat similar to but not quite exact as Gauteng’s Provincial Government of Unity, negotiating issue-based support from different parties on a case-by-case basis. This approach would offer flexibility but also introduce political volatility, making it harder to pass major reforms and maintain stable governance.

A Progressive Left Coalition

The ANC could seek an alliance with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) and other leftist parties. This would align with a more radical redistributionist vision, pushing policies that aggressively address inequality through wealth taxes, land reform, and state-led economic initiatives. The challenge is that in our polity, personalities often matter as much as policies. While the ANC, MKP, and EFF share ideological overlap on economic redistribution and state intervention, their leaders’ personal ambitions, rivalries, and histories could significantly shape or derail any alliance.

Ramaphosa, who is largely seen as representing the moderate and business-friendly faction of the ANC, is viewed with suspicion by both Malema and Zuma. They see him as too pro-market and a reluctant champion of economic transformation. If an ANC-MKP-EFF alliance were to materialise, Ramaphosa might be pressured to step down, or he could face resistance from within his own party for embracing more radical partners. The ANC’s internal factions (such as the remnants of the RET faction that sympathises with Zuma) could exploit the alliance to push for Ramaphosa’s ouster.

Moreover, EFF’s and MKP’s anti-capitalist rhetoric risks alienating business interests and international investors, potentially exacerbating economic instability, more so considering the historical baggage of corruption and economic mismanagement allegations against Zuma and many in his party. A coalition of the left will surely guarantee South Africa’s exclusion by the Donald Trump administration from AGOA and compound whatever is left of the SA-U.S. relations. Already the Republicans have revived the U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act, which would mandate a full review of the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa and aid Trump’s foreign policy agenda with the tools necessary to impose sanctions on corrupt South African government and ANC officials. 

Further, an ANC-MKP-EFF alliance would likely push South Africa further away from the West, aligning it more with Russia and China. This could lead to diplomatic disruptions, reduced foreign investment, and trade restrictions, making it harder for South Africa to balance its international relations.

By Way of Caution

Ultimately, the ANC’s decision on reconfiguring the GNU will shape South Africa’s economic and political trajectory. The challenge is not just about securing parliamentary numbers but about crafting a coalition that balances ideological commitments with pragmatic governance.

Yet, history and political philosophy warn that no choice is risk-free. Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, Aristotle, and Thucydides have all explored the nature of political contestation and the fragile dynamics of alliances.

Carl Schmitt, for instance, in The Concept of the Political, argued that politics is ultimately about the distinction between "friend" and "enemy," suggesting that even alliances are temporary, as political actors prioritise their own interests.

Thucydides, in History of the Peloponnesian War, documented how Greek city-states formed and abandoned alliances based on shifting power dynamics, often leading to betrayals and unexpected realignments.

These lessons serve as a cautionary tale: the ANC’s coalition strategy must not just be about power retention but about ensuring a governance model that advances both economic sustainability and social justice. The real test for South Africa’s political leaders is whether they can rise above factionalism and self-interest to forge a durable, functional government.

By Zamokwakhe Ludidi Somhlaba,

Head of Political Risk Advisory and Research at Frontline Africa Advisory. The author writes in his personal capacity.