1 Introduction

The power and prestige of France in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered a marked decline in the 21st Century. Francophone States ruled by military juntas, namely Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, which commentators and academics have characterized as the ‘Coup Belt’¹ have annulled military cooperation agreements with erstwhile colonial overlord, France.  Further afield, countries like Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire which have maintained very cordial ties with Paris, have demanded that French military forces either depart from their territories or be scaled down drastically.  The question that logically arises is; how are we to explain this dramatic erosion of power and prestige that France has suffered in its traditional sphere of influence or ‘chasse guarde’?²

2 The End of the Cold War in late 1989/early 1990s and its ramifications for Françafrique

The end of the Cold War in the Autumn of 1989/early 1990s, led to a seismic shift in global power relations. The Anglo-Saxon powers, namely the USA and Great Britain abandoned their historic position of deferring to France when dealing with Francophone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the political elites who emerged victorious in various multiparty elections that had ousted long serving autocrats in French speaking Africa, looked up to the USA, Great Britain and other emerging powers such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Brazil, India etc for investments to further their economic development.

Historically, Spreading the French language is an enduring priority for French diplomacy. French, with 220 million speakers, shares with English the distinction of being the only two languages spoken and taught on all five continents.³ French is ranked as the sixth most widely spoken language in the world, after Mandarin Chinese (over a billion speakers), English, Hindi, Spanish and Arabic, and ahead of Portuguese (between 178 and 240 million speakers). French is taught in education systems the world over, making it the second most widely studied foreign language after English with close on 120 million students and 500,000 French teachers outside France.

All over the world, France plays a significant role through commercial activities, extensive development assistance programs, and defence agreements. French influence has historically been strong especially in francophone Africa. This particularly strong relationship with Africa gave rise to the notion invented by former French President Charles De Gaulle called FrancAfrique.⁴ Simply put Franceafrique refers to the intimate political ties nurtured by the French political elites with the political classes of Paris’ erstwhile colonies in Africa. Through the mechanism of Françafrique, French secret services interfered in the internal affairs of its erstwhile colonies to maintain in power client regimes that promoted France’s interests and fomented coups against governments considered inimical to French economic and political interests.

It will be recalled that the first coup staged in 1963, which led to the assassination of Togo’s first post-independence leader, Silvanus Olympio was reportedly backed by the French Special Services. In early 1963, Olympio had considered leaving the franc zone (CFA), and creating a Togolese currency that would be issued by an independent Central Bank.⁵ In addition, Olympio was treated with deep suspicion by Jacques Foccart, De Gaulles’ Special Advisor responsible for Paris’ ties with African countries.⁶ General Gnassimbe Eyadema who carried out the putsch, ruled Togo until his death in 2005. He was succeeded by his son Faure Gnassimbe in a dynastic succession. Gnassimbe has continued the dynastic rule of the Eyadema clan to the present day. Like the example of Togo cogently demonstrates, France has meddled in the affairs of other Francophone States to promote and preserve its interests in line with the doctrine of Françafrique.⁷

France also has significant commercial and political relations in East Asia and Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, France was an architect of the 1991 Paris Accords, which ended the protracted conflict in Cambodia.

3 The Economics of la Françafrique and Its Detrimental Impact on the Sovereignty of Francophone Countries

Scholar Isabelle King notes that ‘After WWII, then French President Charles de Gaulle began la Françafrique, France’s informal sphere of influence in Africa. Apart from secretly vetting and backing African political elites, he also placed the French colonies in the African monetary zone’.⁸ She further observes that these ‘ zones, which continue to exist today as the CFA, encompass 12 former colonies—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, and Republic of the Congo—plus Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea’. Together, they account for 14 percent of Africa’s total population, cover approximately 965,000 square miles, and represent 12 percent of the continent’s GDP.⁹

Initially, this arrangement ensured monetary stability in regions that were weak from systematic French exploitation. Pegging the West and Central African CFA francs to the current French currency, first the French franc, and later the euro, did lead to lower inflation rates as compared to other African countries. In this transaction, however, member states traded decreased inflation for fiscal restraint and limited macroeconomic options. One of the founding principles of the system was that colonies had to keep 50 percent of their foreign currency reserves in the French Treasury, plus an additional 20 percent for financial liabilities. Thus, member states only retained 30 percent of reserves within their borders.¹⁰ The long-term direct economic trade-offs of the CFA monetary zone have included both diminished per capita growth and limited progress in fighting poverty.

It is this CFA mechanism that has triggered disillusionment and disenchantment among the political classes and the youthful populations of the Francophone states and spawned increasingly loud calls for its abolition as it permanently subordinates the political and economic sovereignty of Francophone countries to ex colonial power France. This resentment against French economic hegemony has consequently pushed Francophone countries, particularly those led by military Juntas into the embrace of the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China at Paris’ expense.  

4 Paris’ Diplomatic Response to Threats to Françafrique

In his first-ever annual address to France's 170 Ambassadors in August 2017, President Emmanuel Macron reiterated plans to keep the African continent at the core of his foreign policy, stating his conviction that “the future of the world will largely be played out in Africa."¹¹  He has also established a new Presidential Council for Africa, whose 11 inaugural members would advise him on African issues and help him prepare for visits to the continent.

At a time when former colonial power France had seen its influence decline in the face of China, India and Germany, particularly in the economic and commercial sectors, French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Algiers for an official state visit, in what many saw as a thawing in frosty relations between Algeria and the former colonial power. The three-day visit, Macron’s second to Algeria as head of state aimed to promote reconciliation and deepen   the bilateral relationship between the two countries.¹²

5 What is the future of Françafrique? Appraisal and Forward Look

The omens for France’s influence and power do not appear particularly auspicious. The three West African countries under military rule, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have not only quit the West African regional bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but have also resigned their membership of La Francophonie, the French equivalent of the British Commonwealth. These military ruled States have formed their own Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES) as a counter weight to the long-established ECOWAS bloc. Mali and Niger have also dropped French as their official language and replaced French with local languages. Further afield, Other Francophone States, namely Togo and Gabon have joined the British Commonwealth despite not having historic political, economic and cultural ties with Great Britain.¹³ Such developments constitute profoundly symbolic setbacks for France and French prestige.  These decisions cogently express the deep resentment that the people of Francophone Africa feel vis-a-vis their former colonising power. Economically, France will be disadvantaged as these countries will forge new economic and security partnerships with the US, UK, Peoples Republic of China, Russia and India.

France needs to speedily overhaul the political and economic foundations of its relations with its former colonies. France needs to use genuine ‘soft power’ to dilute and attenuate the radicalized anti-French hostility that is prevalent in its former colonies. Paris should strive to build a new cooperative framework based on authentic equality, reciprocity and partnership with its former colonies, if it is to salvage the drastically diminished goodwill it may still command in Francophone Africa.  

By Dr Njunga M. Mulikita

Independent International Politics Analyst/Scholar based in Lusaka, Zambia. He was Academic Dean of the School of Social Sciences, Mulungushi University, Kabwe, Zambia (2017-2022). Earlier on in his academic career, Dr Mulikita served as a Short-Term Visiting Political Science Scholar in a number of Universities in France.  

References

1See Alex Vines, ‘Understanding Africa’s Coups’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, , https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/04/13/understanding-africas-coups/, April13, 2024

2‘Chasse guarde’ means guarded or restricted hunting ground.

3 See World Economic Forum (WEF), ‘French is now the fifth most spoken world language and growing—thanks to Africans’; Oct 26, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2018/10/french-is-now-the-fifth-most-spoken-world-language-and-growing-thanks-to-africans/

4 Originally, Françafrique was the deal President  De Gaulle made with Francophone potentates in Africa to guarantee France's independence on the world stage, see https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15170/francafrique%E2%80%99s-high-priest-gives-up-his-secrets; Vol 65 No 20 Published 4th October 2024

5 See Christophe Boisbouvier, ‘Togo: Who killed Sylvanus Olympio, the father of Togolese independence?’ The Africa Report, https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/, Posted on November 4, 2021

6 Boisbouvier, Loc.cit

7 Ndongo Samba Sylla, ‘The crisis of French imperialism: debating military coups in Africa’ Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.62191/ROAPE-2024-0033, 02 October 2024

8 Isabelle King, ‘True Sovereignty? The CFA Franc and French Influence in West and Central Africa’ Harvard International Review , https://hir.harvard.edu/true-sovereignty-the-cfa-franc-and-french-influence-in-west-and-central-africa/, 18.Mar.2022

9 King, Harvard International Review, Loc.cit

10 As above

11 Permanent representation of France to the Conference on Disarmament, The speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, during Ambassadors’ Week 2017. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Speech-by-President-Emmanuel-Macron-Ambassadors-Week-2017

12 See Aljazeera, ‘France’s Macron concludes Algeria visit with new pact’, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/27/frances-macron-concludes-algeria-visit-with-new-pact, 27 Aug 2022,

13 See Douglas Yates ‘Opinion: Gabon and Togo join the Commonwealth’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/opinion-gabon-and-togo-join-the-commonwealth/, 8 November 2022