On June 6, the Russian Wagner private military company (PMC) announced its withdrawal from Mali. Wagner deployed its mercenaries in Mali around three and a half years ago to support the military-led government in counter-terrorism operations.

Wagner declared its mission in Mali as successful, noting its support in training Malian security forces and directly combating armed groups. But this is superficial, considering that Russian mercenaries will remain in Mali under the command of the Africa Corps PMC.

The Africa Corps is a rebranding of Wagner following the failed rebellion and death of the latter’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023. Structurally, Wagner and the Africa Corps differ in terms of their hierarchy. Functionally and operationally, the two PMCs are the same.

Wagner relied heavily on its civilian leaders. The Africa Corps is controlled by the Russian Defence Ministry. This highlights a key structural change by the Kremlin, with President Vladimir Putin seeking to prevent scenarios where state-contracted PMCs rebel against the regime.

Essentially, the Kremlin would have mercenaries deployed in Mali but under a fundamentally different command structure. This is also expected in five other African countries where the paramilitary officers are stationed.

Moscow’s continued deployment of mercenaries in Africa, now under higher state influence, demonstrates its overall foreign policy on the continent. Africa is too important to be neglected by Russia. It remains a strategic pawn in the global geostrategic power play. Russian PMCs are active in countries where Moscow has economic interests.

In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR), Russian mercenaries are deployed to safeguard Moscow’s interests in the mining and oil sectors. The mercenaries also offer guarding services to high-ranking politicians and government officials. I wrote about these countries and Wagner’s deployment and rebranding some time back.

At this juncture, it is important to reflect on Wagner’s touted success in Mali. At best, its mission in Mali was chequered. On the one hand, the threat of armed conflict persists in Mali. In fact, it has worsened in the course of Wagner’s deployment mission.

Data from the Global Terrorism Index indicates a steady increase in terrorist attacks and fatalities in Mali since 2017. The data is even more intriguing if you consider the 2021-2025 period, 2021 being the year of Wagner’s deployment.

Wagner may have substantially supported the Malian security forces in counterinsurgency operations. But it collectively failed to effectively contain armed groups in the country. Multiple factors could be responsible for this.

First, the number of Wagner mercenaries deployed in Mali was/is too small to facilitate any meaningful combat against relatively well-equipped and highly mobile armed groups. The situation could perhaps be different if there were no war between Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of mercenaries, including those from Wagner, are on the frontlines.

Second, Wagner mercenaries highly rely on the intelligence shared by the Malian authorities. Before their withdrawals, Malian forces heavily depended on French troops and UN peacekeepers for intelligence. The exit of the French forces and the peacekeepers may have significantly affected intelligence gathering and sharing.

Third, Wagner mercenaries’ deployment is limited to strategic locations of interest. This, in addition to their small contingents, implies that they cannot sufficiently carry out security operations across the country.

Furthermore, Wagner may not be using highly advanced military equipment, munitions, and technology in its operations in Mali. This mirrors the overall defence and offense paradigm in the country. Despite Bamako and Moscow increasing their defence and military cooperation in the last four years, a significant amount of Russian arms/equipment supplied to Mali is of Soviet era. And these are also limited if you consider the vastness of the Malian territory.

Additionally, some local communities are embedded in the ambitions of the armed groups and do not voluntarily share intelligence with the Russian mercenaries and Malian forces. This is particularly common in northern Mali, where the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebel group is active.

The FLA draws its support largely from the Tuareg ethnic group, and the quest for the creation of an autonomous Azawad state has persisted for over 60 years. Apart from the FLA, terrorist groups such as JNIM are gaining support among some local communities due to the attacks against civilians by Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries.

Can Russia and Its PMCs Improve Security in the Sahel?

The Sahel security environment is too complex for Russia and its PMCs to succeed. The Sahel military regimes pressured the French troops and UN peacekeepers to resign, but political instability and insecurity persist. The junta was perhaps excessively delusional to bank on Russia to replace the French and peacekeepers. They did this in the pretext of pursuing independence, intending to do away with neocolonialism.

I am not suggesting that the French soldiers and UN peacekeepers successfully contained armed groups in the Sahel. And of course, it is public knowledge that former French colonies are neo-colonially tied to Paris. But if the Sahel junta intended to avoid the neocolonial straps, then it would be more sensible for them to look inwards for domestic and regional solutions than to another foreign power.

Russia is misconstrued to be friendlier than the West, and perhaps less parasitic. This denotes naivety in power politics. Russia, like any other foreign power in Africa, is after its interests, usually at the expense of the client states. States cannot exist in isolation. Relations and coalitions are critical. Russia may not have colonised African countries, but this does not mean its power play in Africa is succinctly of any power imbalance. Equality is utopic as far as state relations are concerned. Russia benefits more from its cooperation with African countries.

Credit should be given to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger for establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) regional bloc. I completely agree with the view of these states on the moribund nature of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc, which they exited. But the AES is unlikely to be a magic wand to address insecurity. AES states lack the financial muscle to sustain meaningful regionwide security operations.

In addition, these states have limited military capabilities, and at this point, they need additional support from ECOWAS or a regional force. Russia may not adequately finance the AES joint forces or supply them with enough equipment and munitions.

The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps is unlikely to change Russia’s security operations in the Sahel. The name has changed, the command structure altered a bit, but the substance is the same.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence has a more involved role in the operations of the Africa Corps compared to Wagner. Moscow is unlikely to deploy significant troop numbers in the Sahel despite this structural change. Any deployments of military officers is expected to be for training purposes.

As long as the Russo-Ukrainian war persists, the Sahelian states should stop fantasizing about Russia deploying its military officers in the region. Russia cannot entangle itself in multiple conflicts at this point. This is the primary reason why Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria fell without any meaningful military support from the Russians.

It is safe to assume that Vladimir Putin is a good student of history. Apart from the Russia-Ukraine war, the West’s engagement in active combat in Africa without meaningful outcomes could restrain Russia’s deployment of military officers. The Kremlin would prefer deploying the mercenaries to avoid reputational damage. For instance, the Wagner mercenaries committed human rights abuses in Mali. Wagner takes the blame and not necessarily the Russian government. Africa Corps would therefore be stationed at key sites and not actively pursuing armed groups countrywide.

Local sentiments could work against any hoped success of the Africa Corps mercenaries in Mali. The armed groups in Mali are unlikely to change their perception of the Russian mercenaries. The same applies to the local communities. The name change to Africa Corps is largely optical and not substantial enough to change local sentiments. Africa Corps mercenaries are expected to continue conducting joint operations with Malian forces. The existence of armed militants among the local communities makes the civilians vulnerable to extrajudicial killings. Such human rights abuses occur during security operations.

Stability is currently far-fetched in the Sahel region. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Wagner never succeeded in Mali, and neither will the Africa Corps. Restoring stability in the Sahel goes beyond the shouting of anti-neocolonial slogans. Governments and regional blocs should do things right and not sloganeering.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about governance, armed conflict, political risk, political economy, and foreign policy. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.