China is actually the key driver and primary beneficiary of multipolarity. Even before Russian Premier Primakov suggested this idea in 1998, the Chinese were already discussing multipolarity and laying the groundwork.

The Chinese undertook many actions. They actively promoted their agenda and created numerous institutions and initiatives. Today, the Belt and Road Initiative has about 120 participants. Not all may agree with China, but 109 countries are part of the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), including European countries that are not part of Asia but are still members of the AIIB. Thus, China was the primary impetus behind this, even though Russia was also at the forefront. However, Russia became entangled in all the conflicts that erupted later. So, I would suggest that the key driver is China. It has been the key driver over the last three decades of the idea of multipolarity and also its key beneficiary.

I will list a few points here, followed by some initial policy suggestions for ICWA to consider. So, what are the Chinese motivations in proposing this multipolarity? Firstly, they want to be a pole and protect themselves. They seek to rise and establish constraints on United States hegemony, a goal they have largely achieved.

Today, the United States is strategically reliant on China for magnets and rare earth metals. Recall that the Chinese banned rare earth metal exports to the Japanese in 2003, yet neither the Americans nor the Japanese recognized the looming issue. This oversight led to China's dominance in rare earth metals over the last two decades. These are some of their motivations.

In Chinese parlance, a "pole" is generally quantified in terms of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). Although originating in the Soviet Union, Andy Marshall's office in the Pentagon accepted this concept. However, it is the Chinese who extensively use CNP, and today they are in the fourth position globally, a standing that does not necessarily translate directly into GDP or military strength, but rather represents their comprehensive national power. In terms of comprehensive national power, particularly GDP, the Chinese accounted for just about 3% in 2000. Last year, their contribution to global GDP was nearly 18%. This illustrates the significant progress they have achieved.

They possess the largest Navy in the world, surpassing the number of American naval ships. Of course, quality, not just quantity, matters, and Americans are leaders in that regard. Nevertheless, the Chinese possess substantial naval assets. Today, they are competing significantly in deep-sea exploration, produce 56% of the world's electric vehicles (EVs), and contribute roughly 70-76% of global solar energy. They are making their own efforts in this direction.

The essential goal is to avoid over-reliance on the United States and the associated pitfalls. In the 1990s, when the Chinese began focusing on multipolarity, the then Trade Minister Wu Yi suggested trade diversification, a strategy that took some time to implement. Consequently, today China has become Africa's largest trading partner for the past 15 years, with trade reaching USD 282 billion. They are the second largest trading partner for South America. For the Middle East and West Asia, they are the largest trading partner, with trade totaling USD 450 billion. Furthermore, China is the largest trading partner for ASEAN, Japan, Korea, and India. If services and IT-related trade are excluded, China remains the largest trading partner, with trade around USD 130 billion. Thus, they have diversified trade and reduced their over-dependence on the United States. Yet, they were also actively inviting American and other allied companies to invest in China. Currently, 77,000 American companies operate in China. Additionally, approximately 80,000 European companies, 83,000 Japanese companies, and over 200,000 multinational corporations (MNCs) operate there. This significantly contributes to China's status as the world's largest exporting country. At the same time, they have diversified their trade to include other countries, such as those in Africa, South America, and Asia.

So, that is key to Chinese success today. They have also, in a way, diversified global attention toward what they call the Beijing Consensus instead of the Washington Consensus. To that extent, I think there is a lot of effort to become a normative power in many areas. Today, the Chinese are leaders in five major United Nations bodies: UNIDO, UNESCO, UNCTAD, and the WTO (where they hold the position of Deputy Director-General, but not Director-General), among others. Quite surprisingly, China also used to lead the Human Rights Council in Geneva, among all UN bodies.

So, that's the ability China has demonstrated in becoming a pole in the international system. They created and moved several institutions, creating a favorable position. Today, they are in a leading position in many of these global institutions. So, that's what a pole does.

That's what India needs to do in the future to influence the international system. The Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS are examples. In the SCO, of course, China and Russia are the leaders, if you look at their budgetary contribution. What is important, however, is that the SCO was able to deter NATO expansion by including Iran and various other countries. Recently, Belarus has joined, and other countries are queuing up for SCO membership. This signifies a leading position not just in political and multipolarity institutions, but also in technology institutions. For example, in standard-setting, there is now talk of telecommunication standards and cybersecurity standards.

In the ISO (International Standards Organization), China is now taking the lead in setting all of these standards. This is very important for the next steps in the cyber and outer space domains. These are also things that will be challenging, and the problem of haves and have-nots will also arise, as was seen in the nuclear domain. These are the achievements and motivations China has had in entering the multipolarity debate.

Of course, there are bottom lines and problems that China faces while entering the WTO and the multipolar-related world order. First, China would walk away from multipolarity if it perceives crucial national security threats emerging, such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, or other issues. So, there are limitations to China's multipolarity engagement. Second is the economic and political instability globally, as well as within China. We keep hearing about President Xi Jinping being absent for two or three weeks, out of sight, and so on. These are also turbulent times. There could be limitations to multipolarity, or if alliances become stronger—such as the Quad (which is not an alliance but a security dialogue)—then China would likely walk away from multipolarity. Or, in terms of the failure of any of these multilateral institutions (we did see some melting down of several, as previous speakers have mentioned, like the UN and other bodies), if the Chinese assess a decline in the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, they will probably even walk away from multipolar initiatives.

The second point I wanted to reflect on was the Communist Party Congresses. These are very important, as they set the policy for the Chinese Foreign Ministry as well as for every other aspect of governance.

China first mentioned multipolarity in 1992 at the 14th Communist Party Congress. What did they say? They said this was the end of bipolarity because the Soviet Union had disintegrated at the time. But they also mentioned multipolarity as a very long and complex process that they needed to navigate extensively and benefit from its multipolar tendencies. The 15th Communist Party Congress reiterated the concept of multipolarity. The 16th Communist Party Congress mentioned opportunities in multipolarity. The 17th Communist Party Congress mentions the irreversible nature of multipolarity.

So, what changed between the 16th Communist Party Congress and the 17th Communist Party Congress? China became the world's second-largest economy, reaching USD 10 trillion by 2010, and it then began pushing its influence and providing support to several multipolar institutions like the SEO and others. Remember, the 2009 Yekaterinburg meeting allowed South Africa to join BRIC. Subsequently, the group was also expanded. I believe the 2009-2010 period was very crucial in pushing China further into multipolarity, and it was then that China also benefited significantly from these multipolar tendencies. The 18th Communist Party Congress was far more pronounced because the Chinese began to advocate building a "community of shared destiny," which has now become a watchword in the Chinese Communist Party's lexicon. We do not know what exactly it means, but it basically aims to create allies and friends in the international system.

If China is to rise, its rise must be based, like that of the United States in 1945, on support from friends and allies. It should also be based on establishing bases abroad, even though it currently has only one, the Djibouti base, which it began creating in 2015-2016. However, that is the aspiration China held, as expressed in the Communist Party Congress's decisive policy prescription. At the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017, it began asserting that there was a decline in Western dominance. By "Western," they would mean the U.S., Canada, and the European Union. This decline in Western dominance was seen as an opportunity in terms of global governance. They also aligned with another concept that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov mentioned: global governance. Instead of the rule of law, both Russia and China began mentioning global governance, in which both, as Security Council members, would be able to influence global governance regarding climate change and various other initiatives. The most recent Communist Party Congress mentioned that multipolarity was irreversible. Again, they reiterated this position and began working towards economic globalization. Remember, Xi Jinping attended the Davos meeting and stated, "We are the leaders of globalization." Of course, it is the largest trading partner. It is also the largest investor, having invested USD 1.2 trillion through the BRI and other initiatives, and is influencing across the globe.

To summarize, the motivation behind those party congresses was, first, to curb the United States' hegemony. Second, to create strategic partnerships globally under the rubric of a "community of shared destiny." This was evident in the "limitless partnership" with Russia and with many other countries in that regard.

China also has another major institution: the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conferences. These are trend-setting events that guide the Foreign Ministry in policy formulation. In December 2023, this crucial World Conference stated that "orderly multipolarity" needed to be built. This implies an additional responsibility. "Orderly," in this context, means that there should not be an anarchic situation in the international domain. We did see wars and conflicts globally, but, most importantly, this order must be under the leadership of the Chinese government and the Communist Party. This is the Communist Party's provision, and Xi Jinping extensively mentioned the concept of multipolarity in UNGA debates, in the POA forum, and in various other initiatives. Wang Yi, the Foreign Minister, also mentioned this extensively. Major statements by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on multipolarity were made in 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024.

To summarize, China has been the key beneficiary of multipolarity so far, and amongst the advantages, the primary one is the rise of China itself. While everyone was debating multipolarity and equidistance from the United States, what the Chinese pursued was a G2. In 2009, Obama suggested to the Chinese the concept of a G2, or Group 2, wherein the United States and China would rule the rest of the world. This was Brzezinski's idea of the G2. By advocating multipolarity, they were able to extensively promote China's rise. Technology, investments, multinational corporations (MNCs), joint venture companies, and export processing zones were all in place, making China a key beneficiary of multipolarity.

Norm-setting is one of the key variables in becoming a superpower. Students of international relations would understand Susan Strange's concept of structural power. Today, China is moving towards structural power, and multipolarity has also contributed to that structural power. When one looks at Chinese participation in UN debates or the progress achieved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the New Development Bank (NDB), or other initiatives, this is also specifically reflected in recent technological advancements. The cross-border CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) is a new Chinese initiative, through which they aim to shift away from the SWIFT system, which is dominated by Western banking institutions. CIPS is what the Chinese would prefer, along with de-dollarization.

Trump is discussing de-dollarization and the BRICS, but it is actually China that stands to be the primary beneficiary of de-dollarization. This is indeed the concern that the Reserve Bank of India has regarding cross-border transactions: whether India should join these initiatives or precisely who the true beneficiary of them will be. For example, the Renminbi today accounts for about 3.6% of global transactions. Even though the United States still accounts for about 54% of global transactions, China, through the BRICS, currently aims to introduce the CITS (Cross-Border Interbank Transaction System), a cross-border BRICS currency, and so on.

These are the issues and advantages that China gains by promoting multipolarity. What are the risks involved?

By suggesting that multipolarity should be orderly, China is attempting to manage competition with the United States. China simply doesn't want to abandon U.S. policies and so on. The recent issues concerning rare earth metals and other aspects with the Trump administration exemplify this. Thus, managing competition with the United States is a key focus.

Finally, I would like to state that the Chinese possess three "magic weapons." One is Leninist centralism, through which the Communist Party was established and expanded. The second is the military, the PLA. The third is the United Front. Multipolarity serves as a united front for the Chinese, through which they aim to benefit from every other multipolar partner and enhance their own power within the international system.

The second point I wish to make is that, in Chinese foreign policy, multipolarity is only transitory in nature. This is not a permanent concept, nor will the Chinese adhere to multipolarity over a long period. It is possible that China may hold a different opinion on multipolarity in the future, depending on its relations with the United States.

Lastly, I would suggest that the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) be tasked with reflecting on the RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral, which Lavrov recently mentioned. Moreover, in terms of a policy paper, there is a need to reflect on whether India should join the RIC, specifically considering its revival. As previously mentioned, Primakov proposed this in 1998, and there have been approximately 30 discussions on the RIC format. This is now being revived by Russia due to the Ukraine conflict, the state of Russia-U.S. relations, as well as other global dynamics.

We have not said anything so far on the revival of the RIC. My suggestion here is that, we need to go slow on the RIC because the key aspect is that, China had not really invested in India. China has not really resolved the problems with India. China has not really come forward in terms of resolving several problems that we have had with the Chinese, and the united front here that the Chinese are proposing in the RIC format would be again beneficial to China. That's my suggestion. We need to actually do a professional study on what are the advantages, what are the risks, what are the SWOT analysis of India's participation in the RIC in the future. Thank you for your attention.

By Srikanth Kondapalli,

Professor of Chinese Studies, CEAS, JNU, New Delhi

From Transcript of ICWA Panel Discussion on 'Multipolarity in the 21st Century:  Slightly edited for clarity.