Somali: Mending the Ribbon
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| PM Sharmarke resigned citing tension |
On the surface, the gist of this latest debacle ostensibly centers around “what to do about the draft constitutions for Somalia” produced by the Independent Federal Constitution Commission (IFCC). The IFCC is sanctioned by The Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) – a charter agreed upon in 2004 by factional “leaders” in Kenya. The TFC dictates that a new federal constitution be written within two and half years of the formation of an IFCC. The IFCC was approved on 15 June 2006 by a Presidential Decree (RS-OP/3951-06) and by Parliamentary decision (TFP/1/193/06). Under these decisions, the Transitional Federal Parliament for Somalia (TFP) approved a 15-member commission with the expectation that a draft federal constitution would be ready by mid 2008 and the situation on the ground would be permit a nationwide referendum for its approval.
Regrettably, the IFCC never assumed its role due to infightings amongst members of the then TFG compounded by the gains of grass roots Islamist oppositions that have formed in Mogadishu and spread their control throughout Southern Somalia in 2006. Citing mutual existential interests against Islamist extremists in Somalia, the leadership of the TFG invited Ethiopian forces into Somalia for protection. The face of the Islamist “enemy” was none other than the current President, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who fled the country after the defeat of his rag-tag Islamist militias. The arrival of Ethiopian forces into Somali soil returned the TFG to Mogadishu.
The Djibouti Agreement
After two years of tit-for-tat attacks between Ethiopian forces and Islamist insurgents (Muqaawamo) exacerbated by paralyzing infightings between the TFG officials, the international community organized in late 2008 a reconciliation conference in Djibouti. The conference brought together members of the TFG and a faction of the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) – a political group formed by former members and supporters of the grass-root-inspired Islamist forces.
The calculus by the international community was driven by the fact Ethiopian forces’ presence in Somalia was not sustainable and proved counterproductive to the overall aim. Therefore, a negotiated settlement between the moderate Islamist within the ARS and the TFG was recognized as the only solution to the stalemate and humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was viewed as someone who could not only represent the “voice of reason” within the Islamist camp, but also bring a majority of the insurgents to the government’s side while undermining the cause of the small extremists under the banner of Muqaawamo. This was the single most miscalculation by the international community, and most notably, the Bush administration.
Results of the Djibouti Conference
As per the Djibouti agreement terms, the TFP overwhelmingly approved on January 26, 2009 a measure to expand the members of the parliament from 275 to 550. As a precondition, Ethiopian forces began to leave Somalia. On January 25, Ethiopia announced that their “troops have completed their withdrawal from Somalia.”
On January 31, the TFP, meeting in Djibouti, (s)elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the President of the TFG and extended the transitional period of the government by two years, from its original five years mandate, without any additional substantive changes to the TFC. On February 14, 2009, President Ahmed chose Mr. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as his Prime Minister. Sharmarke’s selection was a calculated gesture to the people of the semi-autonomous Puntland state. The hope was that the President and his Prime Minister shared ideology and vision for the country lest they may become each other’s “enemy” as has happened in the past.
That neither men ever held governmental post or attained any substantive experiences/knowledge in running the affairs of a country like Somalia that has endured nearly two decades of civil war and state collapse was overlooked. The hope was Sharif and Sharmarke were fresh new faces that could usher in new realities in Somalia.
What went wrong ?
The predictable happened. Inexperience, lack of vision, and shared strategy led the chosen and chooser to become embroiled in meaningless disputes while remaining ineffective in achieving any of the mandates they were expected to fulfill.
As outlined above, the IFCC was approved by the TFP, as per the dictates of the TFC, prior to the presidency of Sheikh Sharif. After the Djibouti conference, the Commission was expanded to 30 members to include representative of the ARS. In March 2010 (four years after its initial appointment) the IFCC started its technical work and produced a draft constitution on July 30, 2009.
Reacting to the draft constitution, President Ahmed was reported to have said, “drafting a constitution for a new Somalia is a solemn national undertaking which must be transparent and beyond reproach to ensure that the constitution is vested with legitimacy.” Here, the President was insinuating, as he has done in other press statements, that the process that led to the drafting of the constitution was flawed and not transparent. Let’s scrutinize his actions or lack thereof prior to the draft constitution.
The President knew about the existence of the IFCC and its mandate. Since he took office, he had an amble opportunity to voice his distaste or dislike of the original members of the IFCC, the subsequent inclusion of the members of the ARS, and the terms of reference the IFCC has operated within. The truth is, even though the work of the IFCC was known to all, no one, prior to the release of the draft constitution, had mounted any opposition to either the make-up of the IFCC or the terms of reference they were operating under. This makes the claims/objections from the President’s office and members of the parliament politically motivated and a smoke screen for their collective failures.
The President slept on the job and is now slowly reacting to the real issues at hand. He is right that “drafting a constitution for a new Somalia is a solemn national undertaking which must be transparent and beyond reproach to ensure that the constitution is vested with legitimacy.” In fact, the compilation by the IFCC of this draft constitution is the single most important achievement of his presidency. Rather than mounting meaningless fight over it, the President should have employed calm tactics.
On Sharmarke’s side, the IFCC’s draft constitution appears as Achilles’ heels. This is an issue/document that he wishes to utilize in his search for removing Somalia’s government from the current “transitional” status. That his government never achieved a condition in which such an important document can be discussed/approved by the public is something he emphatically stated as non-issue. To him, the ratification of the draft constitution by selected members of parliament and handful of members of communities across the country is sufficient substitute means of implementing the constitution. That there is no legal basis for such a process under the current TFC is irrelevant to him. All that matters to him is the lifting of the “transitional” status from the government so he can have direct access to “money.” This shows he is less interested in the future of Somalia but keen on “money.”
Sharmarke and Sharif have proven ineffective in addressing everything they were sworn for. They have equally given credence to the premises of Al-Shabab’s ideology due to their lack of cohesive strategy and vision for the country. Sharif and Sharmarke must consequently resign from their posts for the sake of our tired masses.
Recommendations
* The document released by the IFCC is a draft document and must be viewed as such.
* This draft constitution is a good starting point that must be further scrutinized by knowledgeable authorities and the public at large.
* As highlighted by the current and past disputes between the President and Prime Minister, the draft constitution must be scrutinized with regards to the powers it enshrines over the holders of these key positions, their relations, and how each of them discharges his/her duties. We must also consider if this type of governance arrangement is adequate for our people.
* The draft constitution is short in detail as to the make-up of the federated states that will constitute the Somali Republic and how and on what basis these states should be formed.This matter requires national dialogue that can be deferred for future amendments to the constitution by an elected federal parliament. However, there must be clearer/better guidelines.
* There is need for a debate about the status of Mogadishu in the context of the federal governing system.
* With regards to implementation or the ratification of the drafted constitution, no amount of backroom deals or actions by a special committee will ever enshrine the drafted constitution the legitimacy it requires. If Somalia is to be peacefully resuscitated, there must be a political consensus amongst the people of the South, Central, North East, and North West on such a document. The approval of the draft constitution must wait for an appropriate atmosphere where every Somali could have their say through free and fair public referendum.
* We must demand from and express to the international community these simple wishes. It’s the international community that the war-profiteers of the TFG are accountable as they are acting on their behalf.
* We must, without regard to clan or place of origin, demand from the international community that the current federal institutions be preserved until August 2011.
* We must demand that a transparent and thorough process be undertaken, prior to August 2011, involving both Somali stakeholders (led by academics, community leaders, and traditional elders) and the international community, to envisage “what-to-do-next for Somalia” and how best to resuscitate its state. This is not another reconciliation conference, but policy and strategy development process participated by both Somalis of good standing and the international community.
* In the interim, it is paramount that the international community makes a priority for the training, maintenance, and the timely salary dispenses of the current Somali police and armed forces, all of whom are now at risk for desertion.
* We, the people, must once and for all own our problems and stop standing on the sidelines while wolves (warlords, war-profiteers, and defunct politicians without integrity) determine our destiny.
By Abdiwahab Tarey, PhD
[email protected]
The author is a Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Health Research and Researcher at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and Irvine (UCI).