At independence the East African Countries (Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda) inherited the British created East African High Commission. This arrangement was transformed into the East African Common Services Organization in 1962 after efforts to establish an East African Federation had failed in the face of parochial nationalism. The organization experienced a number of difficulties before turning into the first East African Community through the Treaty for East African Co-operation in 1967. Owing to the persistent problems arising primarily from conflicting perceptions of gain, affection and hegemony, the Community finally collapsed in 1977 triggering a long and quite acrimonious process of distributing assets and assigning liabilities to the member states.

The present EAC arose quite literally out of the ashes of the collapsed one. It was a result of protracted negotiations between the three partner states (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) beginning in 1993 when the heads of state signed an agreement to revive co-operation among the three states. These negotiations were in accordance with Article 14.02 of the East African Community Mediation Agreement of 1984 which provided for the exploration and identification of areas of future co-operation. As if no lessons have been learned from the collapse of the community twenty five years ago, the treaty adopts a gradualist and functionalist approach and thus does not differ fundamentally from the earlier efforts. This is particularly reflected in the treaty’s failure to abandon parochial sovereignty in favor of pooled sovereignty as well as to transcend relative economic gains as the driving force and embrace long-term strategic goals.

In 2007, the East African Community members undertook what were known as national consultations on Fast-tracking the political federation. In brief, the reports from the three countries were comparable on the level of support for federation. The respective levels of support were: Kenya – 83%; Tanzania – 97%; Uganda – 87%. On fast-tracking however, there were marked differences between Kenya – 66% and Uganda – 75%, on the one hand and Tanzania – 24%, on the other.

Tanzania’s highest level of support for federation and the lowest for fast-tracking is clearly self-contradictory. Strangely, Tanzanians are highly motivated about federation but not keen on fast-tracking it. If the figures are to be believed, these differences between Tanzania and the others, reveal divergences in the perceptions of why we should federate.

Imperatives of Cooperation and Unity

There are at least four types of rationales or imperatives that lie behind the formation and sustainability of federations. These are affection, gain, security and power. By imperatives we mean the kinds of centripetal forces or propulsive impulses that give rise to the yearning and provide the impetus for unity among the members.

Imperatives arise from actors’ perceptions of whether unity is out of choice or necessity. Necessity is the opposite of choice. The more necessity exerts itself upon choice space, the less the options one has. Thus the more integration is driven by necessity imperatives, the greater the possibility of commitment and sustainability and vise versa. To this end affection and gain belong to choice while threat and power are of necessity. East African integration is essentially vacillating between the choice and necessity imperatives.  

The affection imperative is essentially emotive. It entails maximum freedom of choice. Affection refers to a situation where countries come together because they feel filial bonds of affection. Affection is the weakest imperative for federation since it is largely indecisive, voluntary and unstable.

Gain is by far the most celebrated imperative held responsible not only for the initiation but also the sustenance of regional integration schemes. It entails a combination of choice and necessity. Gain is opportunistic. The preoccupation with material gain is itself the source of the major weaknesses of this imperative since perceptions of gain may differ. The relative distribution and instability of gains is also a source of constant discontent.

Power as an imperative refers to the situation where a regional power forces the neighborhood into an integration arrangement. It entails minimum choice with maximum necessity for the forced. It is hegemonic. Hegemonic integration entails not only the existence of a relatively more powerful country in the region but also the capacity and inclination on the part of that country to meet the costs of hegemony through rewards and sanctions.

The hegemonic model is unlikely in East Africa mainly because there is hardly a country that can be considered a viable hegemony. Nevertheless, suspicions of hidden hegemonic motives on the part of Kenya, for example, persist. It is partly such suspicions that brought about the collapse of the old E.A. Community. The hegemonic model is also handicapped by the preoccupation with parochial sovereignty.

The shared perception of security threat and the quest for collective security and protection is, perhaps, the strongest incentive toward integration. It entails minimum choice with maximum necessity. It is committal. This may occur where two or more countries find themselves locked in a mutually threatening relationship. The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by France and Germany after WWII meant that: “…any war between France and Germany was not only unthinkable but materially impossible.” Peace and security remains at the core of the EU to-day. 

The other situation is when there exists a shared perception of a common external threat. Countries come closer not because of affection, gain or hegemony but out of necessity to enhance their security. Globalization constitutes such a threat to Africa. It is the security imperative that should drive political unity in Africa. This presupposes the collective realization that globalization threatens Africa’s continued existence. This was the meaning of Nyerere’s refrain that: “Without Unity Africa has no Future.”

The following quadrant depicts the inverse relationship between necessity and choice

Necessity Vs Choice Imperatives

The imperatives underlying the renewed East African Community are not very explicit. Basically the Treaty adopts the ‘affection’ imperative. In the first paragraph of the preamble, it invokes the fact that the three countries “…have enjoyed close historical, commercial, industrial, cultural and other relations” and proceeds to recount the organizational forms this relationship has assumed since the colonial days. It is also inspired by the ‘gain’ imperative in so far as it repeatedly stresses equitable sharing of benefits between the partner states. Although the Secretary General’s foreword highlights the recognition “…that small and weak states have no future in this highly competitive world”, (which is the recognition of a common threat), this is not reflected in the treaty itself.

Addressing the issue of the collapse of the earlier community in 1977 and, therefore, anticipating the pitfalls that must be avoided by the current arrangement, the current Treaty identifies the main reasons as; the lack of a strong political will, absence of private sector and civil society participation, disproportionate share of benefits and lack of policies to redress the situation as it deteriorated. However, it fails to mention the narrow un-diversified production base, the dominance of national interests and their collusion with foreign capital or the lack of a clear vision based on a shared perception of threat.

It should also be stresses that the proverbial ‘political will’ is, in reality, a function of the consensual interests of the members. It is only to the degree that there exists a clearly defined common threat and a collective conception of security that ‘political will’ will be forthcoming. This will, in turn, crucially depend on the perception of globalization. Some analysts have compared globalization and its consequences with a global village. Others have preferred quite the opposite metaphor likening the process to a global jungle. From an African perspective, a jungle is as far apart from a village as heaven is from hell. Which of the two images Africa embraces, will ultimately determine its fate as it seeks to establish a new position and role in the emerging international division of labour. 

If you are travelling through an African village at nightfall you are likely to be invited to dinner and probably offered shelter for the night. If, however, you are crossing a jungle at around the same time without being properly armed, you are more likely to be the dinner and, for shelter, end up in the belly of some ferocious beast. When travelling through villages you would be well advised to carry some gifts for your potential hosts; in a jungle be well armed. In a village you can safely travel alone; in a jungle company is mandatory. What is your take? Do you believe that globalization was spawning a global village or a global jungle?

To be continued.

By Mwesiga Baregu

Professor of Political Science and International Relations

St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT) School of Graduate Studies.