China Captures Africa from the West
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| Graphics courtesy |
Since the mid-1990s, China has been consistently upsetting the US and Western dominance in Africa. Even on a global scale, some Western thinkers – for instance communications guru Johan Galtung and world class linguist and social scientist Noam Chomsky have predicted the decline and fall of the American empire. Many posit that China will take US’ place. Indeed, China is today mentioned as having all the characteristics of a superpower. This includes its pole position in Africa today.
In 2009, China overtook the US as the most significant of Africa’s trading partners not only continentally but also in most of Africa’s 54 nations. China has however eschewed hegemonic approaches of carving out a sphere of influence on the continent, settling for governance-neutral values such mutual benefits, non-interference and respect for Africa’s sovereignty. China does not distinguish between ‘black’ Sub Saharan Africa and the mostly Islam Arab Maghreb Northern Africa as does the US. Division of Africa on religious and ideological lines and the framing of some countries and leaders as foes and others as allies have long been criticized as some of the fault lines that might be US’ Achilles heel in the long run.
Because of the indisputable importance of China in Africa today, attempts have been made to tame the Dragon’s rise overtly and covertly. For instance US strategists have been calling for cooperation between the US and China and between China and the EU in Africa’s trade and development engagements. The point of departure here is that Chinese and African leaderships appear to turn a deaf ear to such entreaties instead forging ahead with the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Sino – African ‘bilateral’ diplomatic behemoth that leaves no room for triangulation.
Globally, China and Africa look to support each other’s causes. For instance, African nations under siege, say from the International Criminal Court, use China’s UN Security Council veto power (where Africa too can push China’s interests using the three non-permanent seats it holds at any one time) as well as supporting each over trade matters at WTO and human rights matters at the UN Human Rights Council. It can be recalled that African countries played a crucial role in China’s official return to the UN in the early 1970s. It is also worthwhile noting that China has in principle been pushing for representation of Africa as a permanent member on the UN Security Council against the wishes of the other four members.
Indeed China is neck-to-neck with the US in terms of diplomatic missions standing at 50-apiece for both in Africa while African countries have slightly more diplomatic missions in Beijing compared to Washington. It would appear that China needs Africa’s numbers at international forums while Africa needs Chinese development resources. President Robert Mugabe’s words that Africa “no longer looks to the West where the Sun sets but to the East where it rises” have been indeed echoed by most other leaders on the continent over the past few years.
The main plank for the US-EU African strategy is the missionary approach of exporting Western-style democracy and neoliberal economic policies to Africa as a condition for assistance and engagement. In places like Harare and Khartoum, the Western allies openly advocate regime change where China keeps its distance supporting the incumbent. In Zambia where there was regime change recently, China was one of the first countries to embrace Michael Sata. Some analysts have pointed out that Presidents Robert Mugabe and Osman Ahmed Al Bashir have been framed as foes as part of a wider Western scheme with resources in those countries as the real underlying motivation.
It has long been appreciated, including by Western thinkers and leaders that the Chinese economic and political model marked by cohesiveness and coherence in decision making explains the thousands of contracts they are winning virtually everywhere on the continent. The Chinese are able to make decisions expediently about deals and contracts compared to their Western counterparts. Indeed, some of the checks and balances that US companies are subjected to are quite annoying not only to Western business executives but also to Africans. President Museveni of Uganda is a good example of leaders who have minced no words about the ‘strings attached’ phenomenon.
Surveys have shown that African consumers appreciate Chinese products for their competitive pricing compared to similar products emanating from the US and Europe. The issues of quality for which China has been critiqued in the past have been progressively lessening since its ascension to the WTO a decade ago.
The steady stream of business between China and Africa has been followed through by high level diplomatic exchanges. Lately, China has stepped up its cultural exchanges with Africa principally through Confucius Institutes, scholarships, the arts and an increasing number of high level visits. A testament to this is the fact that President Hu Jintao has been to Africa a record six times while Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao comes to Africa so often. Indeed, every year, the first high level foreign visit by a Chinese leader is usually Africa since that tradition was established in 1991. Last month, senior Chinese political advisor Li Qishen was on hand to officiate at the inauguration of the African Union headquarters, a gift by the Chinese to Africa.
By contrast, an analysis of Western engagements with Africa shows a decline across board – socially, culturally and economically – no doubt because of budget constraints although other factors are at play too.
The fact is that the US is undisputed military power and this shows on the African continent such as AFRICOM – the military command dedicated to Africa; a base in Djibouti; a more recent one for stealth drones in Ethiopia and others. This has lend more credence to China’s “peaceful rise” and “harmonious development” as the country seeks to project the image of a country that is more interest in trade with Africa rather than military adventurism.
It’s not true to say China is the sole beneficiary of African resources considering US and the European Union nations consume roughly one-third of Africa’s main export – oil and natural gas. What is defensible is that China’s engagement in Africa’s resources has been growing and this is what worries the West.
While it is true that China has become a major importer of African minerals, it is also true that most of these minerals had been neglected by the West who considered them too insignificant in quantity. A good example is the remotely located Kitui coal mines which the Chinese have taken up. The Chinese have agreed to the extraction of cobalt, manganese, tantalum, copper, iron ore and other minerals across Africa that the West had given a wide berth. At any rate, the Chinese demand for resources – particularly oil and natural gas – is good for Africa because this has led to a spike in prices meaning African countries can earn more from their natural resources.
While criticism was leveled at China for imports into Africa, analysis now shows that most of its imports to Africa have moved away from low end products that can be produced in Africa such as textiles, to high end capital intensive goods and services such as telecoms, roads and bridges.
As Dambisa Moyo has noted in Dead Aid, China does not dabble in aid to Africa much except for emergency interventions such as the ongoing famine relief interventions in the Horn Africa where the Chinese Red Cross is involved. This is as it should be for donor aid that has little input in Africa’s economic development. As one commentator has put it, donor aid is the disease of which it pretends to be the cure. Indeed the Chinese approach of long term loans with concessionary financing and devoid of proselytizing conditionality have proved a welcome deflection from the Western model.
The other reason why Chinese funding is having the desired impact in Africa is that the state is involved in sourcing financing, overseeing overall regulation in addition to companies such as ZTE and Huawei for instance rolling out intensive marketing strategies. The West loses out on this score thanks to mantras such as ‘government has no business being in business.’
One of the most significant deals for China in Africa was in 2008 when the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China bought a 20 per cent stake in South Africa’s Standard for about $5 billion. Other banks with a footprint in Africa include China Export-Import Bank that undertakes export sellers and buyers credit, Construction Bank of China which is active in the huge construction and engineering works and Bank of China that finances viable business ventures. China Africa Development Bank runs an equity fund and is on the prowl for business deals tapping into African entrepreneurship.
The success of China in Africa reclines on the fact that development finance and assistance has been experimented and refined over time by “feeling for stones while crossing the stream,” in the words of Deng Xiaoping the reformist President.
While a good number of Western donor funding goes to programmes in the democracy area, Chinese projects are mainly infrastructure inclined – roads and bridges, airports and seaports, telecoms and power plants, mineral extraction and water generation, etc, in other words, projects that have a direct impact on development.
The Chinese model – referred to as agency restraint – is one where countries with huge natural resources such as Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo can have infrastructure built for them and paid through future exports thus overriding the resource curse disease.
By Bob Wekesa
The writer is a journalist studying international communication at the Communication University of China in Beijing.