Part 3

Fighting Corruption Effectively

What breeds corruption, bribery, and other types of malfeasance in modern Africa are the pervasive state controls and regulations; concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the state or a few individuals, the institution of undemocratic systems of governance that lack accountability, the muzzling of the press to expose corruption, the perversion of the judicial system, banishing the rule of law; and an elite culture that tolerates high levels of corruption. Obviously it would be futile to rail against corruption and still keep in place the very system which breeds it.

The Byzantine maze of state controls and regulations provide the ruling elites with rich opportunities for self-aggrandizement. Revenue collection, passport control, and even government stationery can all be diverted, manipulated or used for illicit gain. Civil servants demand bribes, exploit their positions in government, and manipulate the state's regulatory powers to supplement their meager salaries. Almost every government regulation and nuance of policy can be "exploited" for private gain.

Corruption has become the canker of the African body politic: malignant and pervasive. It has remained an intractable problem because the prevailing intellectual environment characterized by brutal repression, censorship and state control of the media, does not permit an exposure of the problem. This is aggravated by the absence of rule of law. The crooks are seldom caught and the law can hardly be enforced when the chief culprit is often the head of state himself.

In the post-colonial period, corrupt Nigerian governments have combated corruption half-heartedly and cynically with ad hoc measures, such as probes and anti-corruption commissions. Most Nigerians collapsed into hysterical laughter when they heard their head of state, General Sani Abacha, had launched "a war on corruption," because they knew "several of his cronies, active or retired, are millionaires and no military men involved in the banking scandal [that cost the country $180 million] have been touched. `When the soldiers have eaten enough, he retires them,' said a civil-rights lawyer." Recall that from 1988 to 1994, Nigeria's military rulers squandered $12.4 billion in oil revenue, estimated by the September 1994 Pius Okigbo Commission to be a third of the nation's foreign debt. A Petroleum Trust Fund set up by former head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida "lost" $600 million. No one was prosecuted. In fact, for an entire decade – 1990 to 2000 – not one single high government official was indicted and punished for corruption. Since corrupt governments hardly reform themselves, the pressure must come from outside the state – from civil society.

Fighting corruption effectively requires: exposing the problem, which is the business of the media, appointing an aggressive Attorney-General and punishing the corrupt for all to see that crime does not pay. No exceptions to the rule of law.

The first step has been stymied by the fact that the media is controlled by the state. Only 8 African countries have a free media. The state uses the media to control the flow of information and conceal corruption and wrong-doing. When intrepid journalists expose them, they are brutally assaulted by security forces – or worse.

On Feb 22, 1998, armed soldiers invaded the Ondo State television station, ransacked the editorial offices and took away the evening bulletins which included accounts of the assault on the station's media managers, Dunni Fagbayiyo and Tunde Yusuff. Five days later, unidentified gunmen killed Tunde Oladepo, a senior editor of The Guardian, after breaking into his Ogun State home. He was shot to death in front of his wife and children. The murderers stayed in the house for 30 minutes after shooting him to make sure the journalist was dead.

Attacks on the media continued, even under the “democratic” regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo. On April 4, 2000, nine armed members of the dreaded State Security Service (SSS) invaded This Day newspaper offices in Abuja, claiming they were looking for “subversive and incriminating documents.” Earlier on Jan 19, 2000, 50 police raided the international press center in Lagos with guns drawn, demanding computer files and arresting journalists on suspected charges of terrorism. Obviously, control of the media must be wrestled out of the hands of the state if the fight against corruption is to succeed.

Second, an aggressive Attorney-General or anti-corruption czar should be appointed and given the powers of prosecution. Third, combating corruption will require reforming the judicial system. Only an independent judiciary can establish the rule of law and prosecute corrupt government officials. As we have seen, state governors loot with impunity because the corrupt are seldom punished.

The pervasive array of state controls which breed corruption and malpractices must be removed. It entails the removal of controls on prices, exchange rates, imports, exports, rents, and others. These controls did not exist in Africa's own indigenous economic system in the first place. Such measures would liberalize the economy, by taking economic power out of the hands of the state and giving it back to the people where it rightly belongs. Incidentally, this is partly what Structural Adjustment Programs are intended to do.

An independent central bank is also vital, as can be discerned from the following quote:

“Swiss judicial authorities have opened an inquiry into alleged money laundering and participation in a criminal organization involving Nigeria’s late leader Sani Abacha and his entourage. Abacha, his eldest son Muhammed Sani Abacha, his widow Mariam and brother Abdulkadir, are among those accused by Nigeria’s elected government of having “systematically plundered” the country’s central bank, a Swiss statement said earlier in October, 1999. A Geneva lawyer representing the Nigerian Government alleges Abacha and his entourage diverted $2.2 billion from the Central Bank alone” (The Washington Post, Oct 27, 1999; p.A25).

I would recommend rotating governors of central banks in a region, say West Africa; which would help enhance the “independence” of the central bank. Further, to help combat corruption effectively, it might be best to appoint a non-national (a Westerner or African) to head the anti-corruption units. For example, a Ghanaian may be appointed in Nigeria and a Nigerian in Kenya. The reason is that quite often non-national Africans do perform well when pulled out of their socio-cultural environment since they are not burdened by a myriad of social obligations. A Ghanaian is not Yoruba or Igbo and therefore cannot be expected to grant special tribal favors to a corrupt Yoruba politician.

Lessons must be drawn from anti-corruption efforts in other African countries. African governments set up anti-corruption commissions with no teeth to prosecute the corrupt. And when they snoop too close, they are shut down. Such was the case of Richard Leakey, appointed by Kenya’s ex-president Daniel arap Moi in July 1999 to head the civil service in an effort to eradicate corruption. But when he pried too close, he was sacked six months later. The next anti-corruption czar, John Githongo, appointed in 2001 by the new president, Mwai Kibaki, did not fare better. When he fingered thieving ministers, threats were made on his life and he fled to Britain in 2005.

The rare case of success in the fight against corruption comes from South Africa. There President Thabo Mbeki swung into action and established “The Scorpions,” South Africa’s elite anti-corruption unit, which had pursued “bigger fish” – senior members of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). The Scorpions went after Jacob Zuma, the deputy president and the most likely successor to President Mbeki, who was accused of (and denies) asking for 500,000 rand (or $68,000) from a foreign arms company, Thales, to protect it from a probe into alleged kickbacks. Other senior government officials also felt the sting of The Scorpions: Tony Yengeni, chief whip of the African National Congress was jailed in 2003 as was Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, former wife of Nelson Mandela. The conviction of Yengeni centered on his purchase of a luxury sport utility vehicle that was sold to him at a steep discount by a defense contractor. The contractor, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co., eventually won a contract to build radar systems as part of a $6 billion package of weapons purchases made by the government in 2001.

Mrs. Madikizela-Mandela, the president of the ANC’s Women’s League and member of Parliament, was convicted of defrauding a bank of more than $103,000. She was still a Member of Parliament when she was jailed. She was involved in a scheme in which a codefendant obtained personal loans for fictitious Women's League employees by using her name and letterhead to support the fraudulent loan applications. Mrs. Madikizela-Mandela publicly denied the bank fraud charges. In an interview with the City Press newspaper, she acknowledged financial problems, but said the investigation was inspired by her rivals within the A.N.C. She had been one of Mr. Mbeki's most vocal critics, assailing him for questioning whether H.I.V. causes AIDS and condemning the government for promoting conservative economic polices that she says neglect the poor. "One can safely conclude that the campaign is being waged within my organization," Mrs. Madikizela-Mandela said.

The Scorpions report an impressive conviction rate of 85 percent and enjoy huge popular support. And the secret of their success? According to The Economist (Aug 2, 2003),

Cases of graft are known about largely because the police, newspapers and political parties are free to unearth them. The national prosecuting authority now has over 3,500 staff and fast-rising budget worth 950 million rand (or $129 million) in 2003. In July 2003, Mr. Mbeki authorized a probe into 285 cases of fraud in the department of justice and the courts and police are broadly free of political meddling. The president says of his deputy’s troubles that the ‘law must run its course’” (p.45).

Again, it is worth recounting the ingredient of this successful campaign: freedom to unearth cases of corruption (exposure), prosecuting the corrupt for all to see and providing funds and staff to the prosecuting authority. These ingredients are woefully lacking in Nigeria. If Nigerian leaders want to be popular with their people, they should establish “The Scorpions” or “Black Mambas” in their country.